The metalogical use of Markov-algorithms The quantification calculus (QC)

András Máté

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Definite classes

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Be \mathcal{A} an alphabet. F is a <u>definite</u> subclass of \mathcal{A}° iff there is a Markov algorithm N over some alphabet $\mathcal{B} \supseteq \mathcal{A}$ and a w \mathcal{B} -string s. t. N is applicable to every f \mathcal{A} -string and $f \in F$ iff N(f) = w. A class of strings of an alphabet is *decidable* if there is some effective procedure that decides about any string of the alphabet whether it is a member of the class or not (informal notion). This is the corresponding formal notion:

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Markov thesis: Every effective procedure can be simulated by a Markov algorithm and every Markov algorithm is an effective procedure. Therefore, 'definite' and 'decidable' is the same. This is an *empirical* proposition that can be reinforced (although not proved) or refuted by examples.

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Definite and inductive classes

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Theorem 1: Let us have an algorithm N over some alphabet $\mathcal{B} \supseteq \mathcal{A}$ that is applicable for every \mathcal{A} -string. Then we can construct a calculus K over some $\mathcal{C} \supseteq \mathcal{B}$ using a code letter $\mu \in \mathcal{C} - \mathcal{B}$ such that for all $x \mathcal{A}$ -string and $y \mathcal{B}$ -string, N(x) = y iff $K \mapsto x\mu y$.

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Proof: Be $N = \langle C_1, C_2, \ldots, C_n \rangle$. The calculus K will be the union of the calculi K_1, K_2, \ldots, K_n associated to the commands of N plus a calculus K_0 .

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Proof(continuation)

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If the command C_i is of the form $\emptyset \to v_i$ or $\emptyset \to .v_i$, then the calculus K_i consists of the single rule

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If C_i is of the form $u_i \to v_i$ or $u_i \to .v_i$, where $u_i = b_1 b_2 ... b_k$, then the calculus K_i will be this:

$$\begin{array}{lll} i1. & \Delta_{i1}x \\ i2. & x\Delta_{i1}by \to xb\Delta_{i1}y & b \in \mathcal{B} - \{b_1\} \\ i3. & x\Delta_{ij}by \to x\Delta_{i1}by & b \in \mathcal{B} - \{b_j\}, 1 \leq j \leq k \\ i4. & x\Delta_{ij}b_jy \to xb_j\Delta_{i,j+1}y & 1 \leq j \leq k \\ i5. & x\Delta_{ij} \to \Delta_{i0}x & 1 \leq j \leq k \\ i6. & xu_i\Delta_{i,k+1}y \to xu_iy\Delta^ixv_iy \end{array}$$

 $(\Delta^i, \Delta_{i0}, \Delta_{i1}, \dots \Delta_{ik}, \Delta_{i,k+1} \text{ are auxiliary} [etters]) \in \mathbb{R}$

Proof(continuation2)

The calculus K_0 :

1.
$$x\Delta^{1}y \rightarrow xZy$$

2. $\Delta_{10}x \rightarrow x\Delta^{2}y \rightarrow xZy$
3. $\Delta_{10}x \rightarrow \Delta_{20}x \rightarrow x\Delta^{3}y \rightarrow xZy$
...
 $i+1$. $\Delta_{10}x \rightarrow \ldots \rightarrow \Delta_{i0}x \rightarrow x\Delta^{i+1}y \rightarrow xZy$
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 n . $\Delta_{10}x \rightarrow \ldots \rightarrow \Delta_{n-1,0}x \rightarrow x\Delta^{n}y \rightarrow xZy$
 $n+1$. $xMy \rightarrow yMz \rightarrow xMz$
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where in the *i*th rule $(1 \le i \le n) Z$ stands for μ if C_i is a stop command and for M if it is not.

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Be K the calculus representing N according to the the previous theorem (\mathcal{C} , μ like in the previous theorem, too.) Then for any $f \in \mathcal{A}^{\circ}$, $N(f) = g \Leftrightarrow K \mapsto f \mu g$.

Then N(f) = w iff $K \mapsto x\mu w$. Let us add the rule $x\mu w \to x$ to K to get the calculus K'. From the proof of the previous theorem you can see that K derives no \mathcal{A} -string, therefore K' derives \mathcal{A} -strings by using this last rule only.

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Therefore, for any \mathcal{A} -string f,

$$f\in F\Leftrightarrow N(f)=w\Leftrightarrow K\mapsto f\mu w\Leftrightarrow K^{'}\mapsto f.$$

I.e., K' defines inductively F.

Decidable and inductive classes

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Decidable and inductive classes

A decision algorithm for some string class \mathcal{A} can be modified to an algorithm that decides its complement class (for the class of \mathcal{A} -strings). (See the identifying algorithm.) Therefore, if a string class is definite, then both the class itself and its complement are inductive ones. A decision algorithm for some string class \mathcal{A} can be modified to an algorithm that decides its complement class (for the class of \mathcal{A} -strings). (See the identifying algorithm.) Therefore, if a string class is definite, then both the class itself and its complement are inductive ones.

According to the Markov thesis, decidable classes are the same as definite classes. Therefore, if a class is decidable, then both the class and its complement are inductive classes. We have seen earlier the converse of this claim. Hence, a string class F is decidable if and only if both F and its complement are inductive classes.

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We have proven (27th September presentation) that the class of autonomous numerals Aut is inductive, but its complement for the class of all numerals, i. e. the class of non-autonomous numerals is not inductive. Therefore, it is not decidable.

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Logical calculi

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Base of the inductive definition: a class of formulas deducible from the empty class of premises (*basic formulas* or *logical axioms*).

Inductive rules (rules of deduction, proof rules) prescribe how you can arrive from some given relations $\Gamma \vdash A_1, \Gamma \vdash A_2, \ldots$ to some new relation $\Gamma \vdash A$.

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Logical calculi (continuation)

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Equivalence of different calculi (for the same family of languages): on the natural way (the extension of the relation \vdash is the same).

A natural demand for the class of logical axioms and the rules of deduction: they should be decidable.

First-order languages

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First-order languages

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A first-order language \mathcal{L}^1 is a quintuple

< Log, Var, Con, Term, Form >

where $Log = \{(,), \neg, \supset, \forall, =\}$ is the class of logical constants, Var is the infinite class of variables defined inductively, and $Con = N \cup P = \bigcup_{a \in A} P_a \cup \bigcup_{a \in A} N_a$ is the class of non-logical constants containing all the classes P_a of *a*-ary predicates and N_a of *a*-ary name functors.

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It is assumed that for $a_i \neq a_j \in A$, $N_{a_i} \cap N_{a_j} = P_{a_i} \cap P_{a_j} = \emptyset$ and $N \cap P = \emptyset$.

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Terms and *a*-tuples of terms

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The class of *a*-tuples of terms $a \in A$ is T(a).

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1.
$$Var \subseteq Term$$

2. $T(\emptyset) = \{\emptyset\}$
3. $(s \in T(a) \& t \in Term) \Rightarrow \lceil s(t) \rceil \in T(ao)$
4. $(\varphi \in N_a \& s \in T(a)) \Rightarrow \lceil \varphi s \rceil \in Term$

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- 1. $\pi \in P_a \& s \in T(a) \Rightarrow \lceil \pi s \rceil \in Form$
- $2. \quad s,t \in Term \Rightarrow \ulcorners = t\urcorner \in Form$
- 3. $A \in Form \Rightarrow \neg A \neg \in Form$
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Be $A, B \in Form$. B is a <u>subformula</u> of A iff A is of the form $uBv \ (u, v \in \mathcal{A}^{\circ})$.

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If $x \in Var$ and $A \in Form$, an occurrence of x in A is a <u>bound occurrence of x in A</u> iff it lies in a subformula of A of the form $\forall xB$. Other occurrences are called <u>free occurrences</u>.

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Be $A \in Form$, $x, y \in Var$. y is substitutable for x in A iff for every subformula of A of the form $\forall yB, B$ is free from x.

 $t \in Term$ is <u>substitutable</u> for x in A iff every variable occurring in t is substitutable. If t is substitutable for x in A, then $A^{t/x}$ denotes (in the metalanguage) the formula obtained from Asubstituting t for every free occurrence of x in A.

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- ii If $A \in BF$ and $x \in Var$, then $\lceil \forall xA \rceil \in BF$.

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Base for the inductive definition of $\Gamma \vdash A$: if $A \in \Gamma \cup BF$, then $\Gamma \vdash A$. Inductive rule is detachment: if $\Gamma \vdash A$ and $\Gamma \vdash A \supset B$, then $\Gamma \vdash B$.

• Deduction Theorem: If $\Gamma \cup \{A\} \vdash C$, then $\Gamma \vdash A \supset C$.

- Deduction Theorem: If $\Gamma \cup \{A\} \vdash C$, then $\Gamma \vdash A \supset C$.
- Cut: If $\Gamma \vdash A$ and $\Gamma' \cup \{A\} \vdash B$ then $\Gamma \cup \Gamma' \vdash B$.

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Base for the inductive definition of $\Gamma \vdash A$: if $A \in \Gamma \cup BF$, then $\Gamma \vdash A$. Inductive rule is detachment: if $\Gamma \vdash A$ and $\Gamma \vdash A \supset B$, then $\Gamma \vdash B$.

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A definition: If $A \in Form$ and the variables having free occurrences in A are $x_1, x_2, \ldots x_n$, then the <u>universal closure</u> of A is the formula $\forall x_1 \forall x_2 \ldots \forall x_n A$.

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András Máté metalogic 11th October

Given any logical calculus Σ in a language \mathcal{L} and a class Γ of formulas of \mathcal{L} , the class of the consequences of Γ is the class

$$Cns(\Gamma) = \{A \in Form : \Gamma \vdash_{\Sigma} A\}$$

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The <u>theorems</u> of T are the members of $Cns(\Gamma)$. T is said consistent resp. inconsistent if Γ is consistent resp. inconsistent.

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