# <span id="page-0-0"></span>The metalogical use of Markov-algorithms The quantification calculus  $(QC)$

András Máté

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### Definite classes

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A class of strings of an alphabet is decidable if there is some effective procedure that decides about any string of the alphabet whether it is a member of the class or not (informal notion). This is the corresponding formal notion:

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Be  $A$  an alphabet. F is a definite subclass of  $A^{\circ}$  iff there is a Markov algorithm N over some alphabet  $\mathcal{B} \supset \mathcal{A}$  and a w B-string s. t. N is applicable to every f A-string and  $f \in F$  iff  $N(f) = w$ .

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Markov thesis: Every effective procedure can be simulated by a Markov algorithm and every Markov algorithm is an effective procedure. Therefore, 'definite' and 'decidable' is the same. This is an empirical proposition that can be reinforced (although not proved) or refuted by examples.

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### Definite and inductive classes

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Earlier, informal argument: a class of strings is decidable iff both the class itself and its complement is inductive. We want to prove the formal counterpart of it, with 'definite' instead of `decidable'. First step: we show that Markov-algorithms can be represented by canonical calculi.

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**Theorem 1**: Let us have an algorithm N over some alphabet  $\mathcal{B} \supset \mathcal{A}$  that is applicable for every  $\mathcal{A}$ -string. Then we can construct a calculus K over some  $\mathcal{C} \supseteq \mathcal{B}$  using a code letter  $\mu \in \mathcal{C} - \mathcal{B}$  such that for all x A-string and y B-string,  $N(x) = y$ iff  $K \mapsto x\mu y$ .

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Proof: Be  $N = \langle C_1, C_2, \ldots, C_n \rangle$ . The calculus K will be the union of the calculi  $K_1, K_2, \ldots K_n$  associated to the commands of N plus a calculus  $K_0$ .

 $\mathcal{A} \oplus \mathcal{B} \rightarrow \mathcal{A} \oplus \mathcal{B} \rightarrow \mathcal{A} \oplus \mathcal{B}$ 

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## <span id="page-9-0"></span>Proof(continuation)

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# <span id="page-10-0"></span>Proof(continuation)

If the command  $C_i$  is of the form  $\emptyset \to v_i$  or  $\emptyset \to v_i$ , then the calculus  $K_i$  consists of the single rule

 $x\Delta^iv_ix$ 

 $(\Delta^i$  is an auxiliary letter.)

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If  $C_i$  is of the form  $u_i \to v_i$  or  $u_i \to v_i$ , where  $u_i = b_1 b_2 \dots b_k$ , then the calculus  $K_i$  will be this:

\n- i1. 
$$
\Delta_{i1}x
$$
\n- i2.  $x\Delta_{i1}by \rightarrow xb\Delta_{i1}y$
\n- i3.  $x\Delta_{ij}by \rightarrow x\Delta_{i1}by$
\n- i4.  $x\Delta_{ij}b_jy \rightarrow xb_j\Delta_{i,j+1}y$
\n- i5.  $x\Delta_{ij} \rightarrow \Delta_{i0}x$
\n- i6.  $xu_i\Delta_{i,k+1}y \rightarrow xu_iy\Delta^i xv_iy$
\n

 $(\Delta^i, \Delta_{i0}, \Delta_{i1}, \ldots \Delta_{ik}, \Delta_{i,k+1} \text{ are auxiliary letters.})$  $(\Delta^i, \Delta_{i0}, \Delta_{i1}, \ldots \Delta_{ik}, \Delta_{i,k+1} \text{ are auxiliary letters.})$  $(\Delta^i, \Delta_{i0}, \Delta_{i1}, \ldots \Delta_{ik}, \Delta_{i,k+1} \text{ are auxiliary letters.})$  $(\Delta^i, \Delta_{i0}, \Delta_{i1}, \ldots \Delta_{ik}, \Delta_{i,k+1} \text{ are auxiliary letters.})$  $(\Delta^i, \Delta_{i0}, \Delta_{i1}, \ldots \Delta_{ik}, \Delta_{i,k+1} \text{ are auxiliary letters.})$  $(\Delta^i, \Delta_{i0}, \Delta_{i1}, \ldots \Delta_{ik}, \Delta_{i,k+1} \text{ are auxiliary letters.})$  $(\Delta^i, \Delta_{i0}, \Delta_{i1}, \ldots \Delta_{ik}, \Delta_{i,k+1} \text{ are auxiliary letters.})$  $\Omega$ András Máté [metalogic 11th October](#page-0-0)

# <span id="page-12-0"></span>Proof(continuation2)

The calculus  $K_0$ :

1. 
$$
x\Delta^1 y \rightarrow xZy
$$
  
\n2.  $\Delta_{10}x \rightarrow x\Delta^2 y \rightarrow xZy$   
\n3.  $\Delta_{10}x \rightarrow \Delta_{20}x \rightarrow x\Delta^3 y \rightarrow xZy$   
\n...  
\n $i+1. \Delta_{10}x \rightarrow ... \rightarrow \Delta_{i0}x \rightarrow x\Delta^{i+1}y \rightarrow xZy$   
\n...  
\n $n. \Delta_{10}x \rightarrow ... \rightarrow \Delta_{n-1,0}x \rightarrow x\Delta^n y \rightarrow xZy$   
\n $n+1. xMy \rightarrow yMz \rightarrow xMz$   
\n $n+2. xMy \rightarrow y\mu z \rightarrow x\mu z$ 

where in the *i*th rule  $(1 \leq i \leq n)$  Z stands for  $\mu$  if  $C_i$  is a stop command and for  $M$  if it is not.

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where in the *i*th rule  $(1 \leq i \leq n)$  Z stands for  $\mu$  if  $C_i$  is a stop command and for M if it is not. Now the calculus  $K$  is ready.

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**Theorem 2.** If  $A$  is an alphabet and  $F$  is a definite subclass of  $\mathcal{A}^{\circ}$ , then F is an inductive subclass of it.

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Be K the calculus representing N according to the the previous theorem  $(\mathcal{C}, \mu)$  like in the previous theorem, too.) Then for any  $f \in \mathcal{A}^{\circ}, N(f) = g \Leftrightarrow K \mapsto f\mu g.$ 

Then  $N(f) = w$  iff  $K \mapsto x \mu w$ . Let us add the rule  $x \mu w \to x$  to  $K$  to get the calculus  $K'$ . From the proof of the previous theorem you can see that  $K$  derives no  ${\mathcal{A}}\text{-string, therefore } K^{'}$ derives A-strings by using this last rule only.

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Therefore, for any  $A$ -string f,

$$
f \in F \Leftrightarrow N(f) = w \Leftrightarrow K \mapsto f\mu w \Leftrightarrow K^{'} \mapsto f.
$$

I.e.,  $K'$  defines inductively  $F$ .

### Decidable and inductive classes

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## Decidable and inductive classes

A decision algorithm for some string class  $\mathcal A$  can be modified to an algorithm that decides its complement class (for the class of A-strings). (See the identifying algorithm.) Therefore, if a string class is definite, then both the class itself and its complement are inductive ones.

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According to the Markov thesis, decidable classes are the same as definite classes. Therefore, if a class is decidable, then both the class and its complement are inductive classes. We have seen earlier the converse of this claim. Hence, a string class  $F$  is decidable if and only if both F and its complement are inductive classes.

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We have proven (27th September presentation) that the class of autonomous numerals  $Aut$  is inductive, but its complement for the class of all numerals, i. e. the class of non-autonomous numerals is not inductive. Therefore, it is not decidable.

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# Logical calculi

Next goal: the first-order theory of canonical calculi. In our metalogic, this theory will be the basic example for incompleteness.

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Logical calculus:

• An L family of languages with a distinguished category  $Form_L$ ;

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Logical calculus:

- An L family of languages with a distinguished category  $Form_L$ ;
- $\bullet$  Inductive definition of the *syntactic* consequence (deducibility) relation  $\Gamma \vdash_L A$ , where  $\Gamma \subseteq Form_L$ (premises) and  $A \in Form_L$  (conclusion).

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Inductive rules (rules of deduction, proof rules) prescribe how you can arrive from some given relations  $\Gamma \vdash A_1, \Gamma \vdash A_2, \ldots$  to some new relation  $\Gamma \vdash A$ .

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## Logical calculi (continuation)

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Different ways to define the deducibility relation: many axioms and only one or two rules of deduction (Frege-Hilbert style of calculus) versus no axioms at all, only rules (Gentzen-style or natural deduction systems).

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Equivalence of different calculi (for the same family of languages): on the natural way (the extension of the relation ⊢ is the same).

A natural demand for the class of logical axioms and the rules of deduction: they should be decidable.

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### First-order languages

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## First-order languages

All the symbols are strings of some given alphabet A.

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All the symbols are strings of some given alphabet A.

The class of arities  $A = \{ \emptyset, o, oo,... \}$  was defined inductively earlier.

A first-order language  $\mathcal{L}^1$  is a quintuple

 $\langle$  Log, Var, Con, Term, Form  $>$ 

where  $Log = \{(), \neg, \neg, \neg, \forall, \neg\}$  is the class of logical constants,  $Var$  is the infinite class of variables defined inductively, and  $Con = N \cup P = \bigcup_{a \in A} P_a \cup \bigcup_{a \in A} N_a$  is the class of non-logical constants containing all the classes  $P_a$  of a-ary predicates and  $N_a$  of a-ary name functors.

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It is assumed that for  $a_i \neq a_j \in A$ ,  $N_{a_i} \cap N_{a_j} = P_{a_i} \cap P_{a_j} = \emptyset$ and  $N \cap P = \emptyset$ .

 $\mathcal{A} \oplus \mathcal{B} \rightarrow \mathcal{A} \oplus \mathcal{B} \rightarrow \mathcal{A} \oplus \mathcal{B} \rightarrow \cdots$ 

#### Terms and a-tuples of terms

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The class of a-tuples of terms  $a \in A$  is  $T(a)$ .

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1. 
$$
Var \subseteq Term
$$
  
\n2.  $T(\emptyset) = {\emptyset}$   
\n3.  $(s \in T(a) \& t \in Term) \Rightarrow \neg s(t) \neg \in T(ao)$   
\n4.  $(\varphi \in N_a \& s \in T(a)) \Rightarrow \neg \varphi s \neg \in Term$ 

<span id="page-42-0"></span>András Máté [metalogic 11th October](#page-0-0)

 $A\cap B\rightarrow A\oplus B\rightarrow A\oplus B\rightarrow A\oplus B\rightarrow A$ 

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- 1.  $\pi \in P_a$  &  $s \in T(a) \Rightarrow \pi s$ <sup> $\pi$ </sup>  $\in Form$
- 2.  $s, t \in Term \Rightarrow \ulcorner s = t \urcorner \in Form$
- 3.  $A \in Form \Rightarrow \neg A \exists \in Form$
- 4.  $A, B \in Form \Rightarrow \ulcorner A \supset B \urcorner \in Form$
- 5.  $A \in Form \& x \in Var \Rightarrow \forall x A \exists \in Form$

 $\mathcal{A} \oplus \mathcal{B}$  and  $\mathcal{A} \oplus \mathcal{B}$  and  $\mathcal{A} \oplus \mathcal{B}$ 

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Atomic formulas are the formulas generated by the rules 1. and 2.

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Other logical constants  $(\vee, \wedge, \equiv, \exists)$  are introduced by abbreviation conventions.

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$$

3. 
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2. 
$$
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$$

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If  $x \in Var$  and  $A \in Form$ , an occurrence of x in A is a bound occurrence of x in A iff it lies in a subformula of A of the fo[r](#page-47-0)m  $\forall x B$ . Other occurrences are called fr[ee](#page-46-0) [oc](#page-48-0)[c](#page-41-0)[u](#page-42-0)r[re](#page-48-0)[nc](#page-0-0)[es](#page-73-0)[.](#page-0-0)

## <span id="page-48-0"></span>Some further auxiliary notions

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# Some further auxiliary notions

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A formula is open if it contains at least one free occurrence of a variable; otherwise it is closed. Closed formulas are called sentences.

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A formula  $A$  is free from the variable  $x$  iff  $x$  has no free occurrences in A.  $\Gamma \subset Form$  is free from x if each member of it is.

<span id="page-52-0"></span>A term is open iff at least one variable is a substring of it; otherways it is closed.

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Be  $A \in Form$ ,  $x, y \in Var$  y is substitutable for x in A iff for every subformula of A of the form  $\forall yB$ , B is free from x.

 $t \in Term$  is substitutable for x in A iff every variable occurring in t is substitutable. If t is substitutable for x in A, then  $A^{t/x}$ denotes (in the metalanguage) the formula obtained from A substituting t for every free occurrence of  $x$  in  $A$ .

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Given a first-order language  $\mathcal{L}^1$ , the logical axioms (basic formulas) are defined by the help of the following schemes:

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- ii If  $A \in BF$  $A \in BF$  $A \in BF$  and  $x \in Var$ , then  $\neg \forall x A \exists \in BF$ [.](#page-53-0)

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<span id="page-61-0"></span>András Máté [metalogic 11th October](#page-0-0)

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A definition: If  $A \in Form$  and the variables having free occurrences in A are  $x_1, x_2, \ldots, x_n$ , then the universal closure of A is the formula  $\forall x_1 \forall x_2 \dots \forall x_n A$ .

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#### Consequences, consistency, first-order theories

András Máté [metalogic 11th October](#page-0-0)

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The pair  $T = <\mathcal{L}^1, \Gamma > \text{is a first-order theory if } \mathcal{L}^1 \text{ is a }$ first-order language and  $\Gamma$  is a class of its *closed* formulas (called axioms of T).

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The theorems of T are the members of  $Cns(\Gamma)$ . T is said consistent resp. inconsistent if  $\Gamma$  is consistent resp. inconsistent.

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