Title: Syllabus-Minta:
Author: Janos Hardi
Last saved by: Kati
Company: ELTE

Kurzus kódjai: BBN-FIL-324.04 BMA-FILD-322.01 BMA-FILD-324.04 TANM-FIL-402.1 CCNM17-117
Title of the course: Philosophy of Mind
Instructor: Gergely Ambrus

Aim of the course
The course provides an introduction to some of the main topics in contemporary philososophy of mind, i. e. different views on the mind-body relation, the nature of consciousness and intentionality.

Level of course: introductory/intermediate

I. The Mind-Body relation
1. Cartesian Dualism
Descartes, R. Meditations on First Philosophy (II and VI). In CPM.
2. Logical Behaviorism
Ryle, G. The Concept of Mind. Chap. 1. Descartes Myth. In CPM.
Carnap, R. Psychology in Physical Language. In Ayer (ed.) Logical Positivism. New York, Free Press, 1959. 165–198.*
3-4. Materialism
3. Reductionist Materialism: Mind-Brain Identity Theory
Smart, J. J. C. Sensations and Brain Processes. Philosophical Review 68 (1959). 141–56. or in CPM.
Armstrong, D. M. The Causal Theory of Mind. In CPM. 
Lewis, D. An Argument for the Identity Theory. Journal of Philosophy  63 (1966). 17–25.
4. Eliminative Materialism
Dennett, D. Quining Qualia. In CPM.
Churchland, P. M. Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes. Journal of Philosophy 78 (1981). 67–90.
5-6. Functionalism
5. The Functionalist Conception of the Mind
Putnam, H. The Nature of Mental States. In CPM.
Block, N. Troubles with Functionalism. In CPM.
6. The Computationalist Theory of Mind
Classical Cognitivism
Haugland, J. The Nature and Plausibility of Cognitivism. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 1981(2), 215-226. 
Criticism of Classical Cognitivism
Searle, J. R. Minds, Brains and Computers. In CPM. 
7. Anomalous Monism
Davidson, D. Mental Events. In CPM.

II. Consciousness
8. The Problem of Consciousness
Nagel, T. What is it Like to be a Bat? In CPM.
Block, N. Concepts of Consciousness. In CPM.
9. Dualism vs Materialism about Qualia: The Knowledge Argument
Jackson, F. What Mary Didn‘t Know. The Journal of Philosophy 5 (1986). 291-295.
Levine, J. Leaving out What is it Like. In In Davies, M. – Humphreys, G. (eds.) Consciousness – Psychological and Philosophical Essays. Oxford, Blackwell, 1993. 121-136.
 Van Gulick, R. Understanding the Phenomenal Mind. Are We All Just Armadillos (Part I.)? In Davies, M. – Humphreys, G. (eds.) Consciousness – Psychological and Philosophical Essays.
Oxford, Blackwell, 1993. 137-154.
McGinn, C. Can We Solve the Mind-Body Problem? In CPM.
10. Dualism vs Materialism about Qualia: Modal Arguments
Kripke, S.: Naming and Neccesity (exerpts). In CPM.
Chalmers, D. Naturalistic Dualism. In The Conscious Mind. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1996. 123-140.

III. Intentionality
10. The Nature of Intentionality
Brentano, F. The Distinction between Mental and Physical Phenomena (excerpts). In CPM.
Chisholm, R. M. "Intentional Inexistence" (excerpts). In CPM.*
11-12. Naturalistic Theories of Intentionality 
Fodor, J. Meaning and the World Order. In Psychosemantics. Cambridge MA, MIT Press, 1987. 97-127.
Millikan, G. R. Biosemantics. In CPM.
13. Interpretationism: The Intentional Stance
Dennett, D.C. The Intentional Strategy and Why It Works. In CPM.
Dennett, D.C. Real Patterns. The Journal of Philosophy. 88 (1991) 27-51.*
14. Intentionality and Phenomenology
Horgan, T. – Tienson, J. The Intentionality of Phenomenology and the Phenomenology of Intentionality. In CPM.
Abbreviation
CPM = Chalmers, D. (ed.) Philosophy of Mind. Classical and Contemporary Readings. New York – Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2002.

Course requirements, evaluation
(1) Active participation in the course 2) presentation 3) course paper.

Readings
Compulsory reading: listed above, except the texts marked by *.
Suggested further readings: the texts marked by * 
and
Block, N. – Flanagan, O. J. – Güzeldere, G. (eds.) The Nature of Consciousness. Cambridge MA, MIT Press, 1997.
Chalmers, D. (ed.) Philosophy of Mind. Classical and Contemporary Readings. New York – Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2002.
Davies, M. – Humphreys, G. (eds.) Consciousness – Psychological and Philosophical Essays. Oxford, Blackwell, 1993. 121-136.
Stich, S. – Warfield, T. (eds.) Mental Representation. Oxford, Backwell, 1994.