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| Code of course: **BA-ERA-IPH-S-20, MA-ERA-IPH-S-20** |
| Title of course: **Knowledge and Power** |
| Lecturer: **Attila Mráz** |
| **General aim of the course:**The course offers a survey of epistemological issues that are pressing for social and political philosophers—also known as ‘political epistemology’—on the one hand, and it surveys issues in political philosophy that should be pressing for epistemologists and philosophers of science, on the other. In short, we are interested in what is the meaning and relevance of knowledge, justified belief, disagreement and expertise for the justified exercise of political power in liberal democracies—and we will examine how social and political inequalities and power imbalances shape our collective practices of knowledge formation, as well as asking how they should not. These theoretical explorations have wide-ranging applied implications, helping us reflect on political polarization, politically shaped scientific agendas, academic freedom, technocratic politics, sexist or racist scientific and political agendas, and conspiracy theories.**Content of the course:** Topics:* social epistemology, problems of testimonial evidence in politics
* the epistemology of disagreement, and the political philosophy of reasonable vs. unreasonable disagreement
* the role of science and expertise in democracy
* the role of democracy in scientific and academic inquiry
* sexism and racism in knowledge-generation and dissemination,epistemic injustices and epistemic discrimination
* conspiracy theories

**Grading criteria, specific requirements:*** Attendance and active participation (which may include asking questions about unclear points in the reading, reacting to others’ arguments, or voicing your own arguments).
* All students taking the class for credit must submit a term paper of ca. 1500 words on a topic approved by the instructor.

**Required reading:**(Some of the topics will cover more than more class.)1. *Social Sources of Knowledge:* *Testimonial Evidence (in Politics)*1a. *Social and Political Epistemology, Testimony*Goldman, Alvin. (1987). “Foundations of Social Epistemics”, *Synthese*, 73(1): 109–144. doi:10.1007/BF004854441b. *Testimony and Autonomy*Elizabeth Fricker. (2006). Testimony and Epistemic Autonomy. In: Jennifer Lackley and Ernest Sosa (eds.), *The Epistemology of Testimony* (pp. 225–250). Oxford: Clarendon.1c. *Political Testimony and Democracy*Han van Wietmarschen. (2019). “Political Testimony”, *Politics, Philosophy and Economics,* 18 (1):23–45.Brinkmann, Matthias. (2020). In Defence of Non-Ideal Political Deference. *Episteme*, 1-22. doi:10.1017/epi.2020.262. *Peer Disagreement and Epistemic Justification*Christensen, David, 2009, “Disagreement as Evidence: The Epistemology of Controversy”, *Philosophy Compass*, 4(5): 756–767. doi:10.1111/j.1747-9991.2009.00237.xKelly, Thomas. (2013). Disagreement and the Burdens of Judgment. In David Phiroze Christensen & Jennifer Lackey (eds.), *The Epistemology of Disagreement: New Essays*. 31-53. Oxford, Oxford University Press.3. *Reasonable Disagreement in Contemporary Liberal Political Philosophy*Neufeld, Blain. (2013). Political Liberalism and Citizenship Education. *Philosophy Compass* 7(9): 781–797. doi: 10.1111/phc3.12064Rawls, John. (1993). *Political Liberalism*. New York: Columbia UP. II. § 2. ("The Burdens of Judgment"): pp. 54-58. For MA students, also pp. 48–66, 144–158, 103–121, 197–211.Christiano, Thomas. (2008). *The Constitution of Equality. Democratic Authority and Its Limits*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 197–200: “Egalitarian Public Deliberation”.4. *The Possibility of Politics amidst Deep Disagreement*Ebels-Duggan, Kyla (2010). The Beginning of Community: Politics in the Face of Disagreement. *The Philosophical Quarterly* 60(238) 50-71.Talisse, Robert. (2021). The Paradox of Unity. *Arc*, January 26, 2021. https://arcdigital.media/the-paradox-of-unity-feb6b093a8275. *Expertise, Knowledge and Democratic Decision-Making*Anderson, Elizabeth. (2006). “The Epistemology of Democracy”, Episteme: A Journal of Social Epistemology, 3(1): 8–22. doi:10.1353/epi.0.0000Peter, Fabienne. (2016). The Epistemic Circumstances of Democracy. In: Miranda Fricker, Michael Brady (eds.), *The Epistemic Life of Groups*. pp. 133 – 149. Oxford, OUP.Goldman, Alvin. (2001). “Experts: Which Ones Should You Trust?”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 63(1): 85–110. doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2001.tb00093.x6. *Democratizing Scientific Inquiry*Philip Kitcher. (2001). *Science, Truth and Democracy.* Oxford UP. Ch. 10: “Well-Ordered Science”. pp. 117-136.David B. Resnik. (2008). Scientific Autonomy and Public Oversight. *Episteme* 5(2): 220–238. doi:10.3366/E17423600080003367. *Academic freedom*Robert Berdahl (2010). Thoughts About Academic Freedom, Autonomy and Accountability. <http://www.magna-charta.org/resources/files/Berdahl_2010Thoughts_Abou_Academic_Freedom_Autonomy_and_Accountability.pdf>*Magna Charta Universitatum* (1988). <http://www.magna-charta.org/resources/files/the-magna-charta/english>Background information: <http://www.magna-charta.org/magna-charta-universitatum/read-the-magna-charta/the-magna-charta>8. *Conspiracy Theories and Liberal Democratic Responses*Cassam, Quassim (2019). Why Conspiracy Theories Are Deeply Dangerous. *The New Statesman*, 7 October 2019. <https://www.newstatesman.com/world/north-america/2019/10/why-conspiracy-theories-are-deeply-dangerous>Cíbik, Matej & Pavol Hardos (2020). Conspiracy theories and reasonable pluralism. 1-21. *European Journal of Political Theory.* Online First, published 1 April 2020. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1474885119899232>.9. *Epistemic Injustice*Miranda Fricker (2007). *Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing*. Oxford–New York: Oxford University Press. Ch. 1: "Testimonial Injustice", pp. 9–29; Ch. 3: "Towards a Virtue Epistemological Account of Testimony", pp. 86–109.Miranda Fricker (2007). *Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing*. Oxford–New York: Oxford University Press.Ch. 7: "Hermeneutical Injustice", pp. 147–175.Elizabeth Anderson (2012). Epistemic Justice as a Virtue of Social Institutions. *Social Epistemology*  26(2): 163–173.10. *Epistemic Discrimination*Katherine Puddifoot. (2018). Epistemic Discrimination. In: Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen (ed.), *The Routledge Handbook of the Ethics of Discrimination.* London & New York: Routledge. pp. 54–67. |