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| Code of course: **BA-ERA-IPH-S-1, MA-ERA-IPH-S-1** |
| Title of course: **Philosophy of Mind** |
| Lecturer: **Gergely Ambrus** |
| **General aim of the course**:  The course provides an introduction to some of the main topics in contemporary philososophy of mind, i. e. different views on the mind-body relation, the nature of consciousness and intentionality.  **Content of the course  I. The Mind-Body relation**  **1. Cartesian Dualism** Descartes, R. Meditations on First Philosophy (II and VI). In CPM.  **2. Logical Behaviorism** Ryle, G. *The Concept of Mind*. Chap. 1. Descartes Myth. In CPM. Carnap, R. Psychology in Physical Language. In Ayer (ed.) *Logical Positivism*. New York, Free Press, 1959. 165–198.\*  **3-4. Materialism**  **3. Reductionist Materialism: Mind-Brain Identity Theory** Smart, J. J. C. Sensations and Brain Processes. *Philosophical Review* 68 (1959). 141–56. or in CPM. Armstrong, D. M. The Causal Theory of Mind. In CPM.  Lewis, D. An Argument for the Identity Theory. *Journal of Philosophy*  63 (1966). 17–25**.**  **4. Eliminative Materialism** Dennett, D. Quining Qualia. In CPM.  Churchland, P. M. Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes. *Journal of Philosophy* 78 (1981). 67–90.  **5-6. Functionalism**  **5. The Functionalist Conception of the Mind** Putnam, H. The Nature of Mental States. In CPM. Block, N. Troubles with Functionalism. In CPM.  **6. The Computationalist Theory of Mind** *Classical Cognitivism*  Haugland, J. The Nature and Plausibility of Cognitivism. *Behavioral and Brain Sciences*, 1981(2), 215-226. *Criticism of Classical Cognitivism* Searle, J. R. Minds, Brains and Computers. In CPM.  **7. Anomalous Monism** Davidson, D. Mental Events. In CPM.  **II. Consciousness**  8. **The Problem of Consciousness**  Nagel, T. What is it Like to be a Bat? In CPM.  Block, N. Concepts of Consciousness. In CPM.  **9. Dualism vs Materialism about Qualia: The Knowledge Argument** Jackson, F. What Mary Didn‘t Know. *The Journal of Philosophy* 5 (1986). 291-295. Levine, J. Leaving out What is it Like. In In Davies, M. – Humphreys, G. (eds.) *Consciousness – Psychological and Philosophical Essays*. Oxford, Blackwell, 1993. 121-136.  Van Gulick, R. Understanding the Phenomenal Mind. Are We All Just Armadillos (Part I.)? In Davies, M. – Humphreys, G. (eds.) *Consciousness – Psychological and Philosophical Essays*.  Oxford, Blackwell, 1993. 137-154.  McGinn, C. Can We Solve the Mind-Body Problem? In CPM.  **10. Dualism vs Materialism about Qualia: Modal Arguments** Kripke, S.: *Naming and Neccesity* (exerpts). In CPM. Chalmers, D. Naturalistic Dualism. In *The Conscious Mind*. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1996. 123-140.  **III. Intentionality**  **10. The Nature of Intentionality**  Brentano, F. The Distinction between Mental and Physical Phenomena (excerpts). In CPM.  Chisholm, R. M. "Intentional Inexistence" (excerpts). In CPM.\*  **11-12. Naturalistic Theories of Intentionality**  Fodor, J. Meaning and the World Order. In *Psychosemantics*. Cambridge MA, MIT Press, 1987. 97-127.  Millikan, G. R. Biosemantics. In CPM. **13. Interpretationism: The Intentional Stance** Dennett, D.C. The Intentional Strategy and Why It Works. In CPM. Dennett, D.C. Real Patterns. *The Journal of Philosophy*. 88 (1991) 27-51.\* **14. Intentionality and Phenomenology** Horgan, T. – Tienson, J. The Intentionality of Phenomenology and the Phenomenology of Intentionality. In CPM.  Abbreviation CPM = Chalmers, D. (ed.) *Philosophy of Mind. Classical and Contemporary Readings*. New York – Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2002.  **Grading criteria, specific requirements:**  (1) Active participation in the course, 2) presentation, 3) course paper.  **Required reading:**  listed above, except the texts marked by \*.  **Suggested further reading:**  the texts marked by \*  and Block, N. – Flanagan, O. J. – Güzeldere, G. (eds.) *The Nature of Consciousness*. Cambridge MA, MIT Press, 1997. Chalmers, D. (ed.) *Philosophy of Mind. Classical and Contemporary Readings*. New York – Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2002. Davies, M. – Humphreys, G. (eds.) *Consciousness – Psychological and Philosophical Essays*. Oxford, Blackwell, 1993. 121-136. Stich, S. – Warfield, T. (eds.) *Mental Representation.* Oxford, Backwell, 1994. |