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| 9
October (Friday) 4:15
PM ONLINE |
| Márton
Gömöri(1)(2)
and Gábor
Hofer-Szabó(2)
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(1)
Department of
Logic, Institute
of Philosophy, Eötvös
University, Budapest
(2)
Institute of
Philosophy, Research Centre
for the Humanities, Budapest
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On the
Meaning of EPR’s Reality
Criterion
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This essay is motivated
by Tim Maudlin’s recent claim that
EPR’s Reality Criterion is an
analytic truth. We formulate two
independent arguments to the
contrary. The first one will
challenge the received sentiment
according to which Einstein’s
later arguments against quantum
mechanics, making no use of the
Reality Criterion, are just
refined variants of the EPR
argument pointing to the
incompleteness of quantum
mechanics. In particular, we will
show that Einstein’s later
arguments, as opposed to the EPR
argument, do not prove
incompleteness, but rather point
to the inadequacy of the
Copenhagen interpretation. Hence,
the Reality Criterion is not
eliminable from the incompleteness
argument(s); which indicates that
it has a non-analytic content. Our
second argument is more
substantive. We will show that the
Reality Criterion is a special
case of the Common Cause
Principle, and argue that the
latter is a synthetic proposition.
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| 16
October (Friday) 4:15
PM ONLINE |
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László
E. Szabó
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Department of
Logic, Institute
of Philosophy, Eötvös
University, Budapest
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| Physicalism
without the idols of
mathematics |
On the basis of a
coherently applied physicalist
ontology, I will argue that
there is nothing conceptual in
logic and mathematics. So
called “mathematical concepts”
have nothing to do with
concepts, as they have nothing
to do with the actual things;
they are just idols, which
philosophy can completely deny
and physics can completely
ignore.
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