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18
February (Friday) 4:15 PM
ONLINE
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Gábor
Hofer-Szabó
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Institute
of Philosophy, Research
Centre for the
Humanities, Budapest
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Quantum
mechanics without operational
equivalence
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In the talk, I will
investigate some of the
consequences of abandoning
operational
equivalence—equivalence of those
measurements which yield the same
distribution of outcomes in every
state — in quantum mechanics and
in general operational theories.
On the example of a classical
operational theory, the EPR-Bell
scenario and the Popescu-Rochlich
box, I will show that the
ontological models for different
measurements realizing the same
set of operators in quantum
mechanics, or more generally, for
different operational theories
comprising different but
operationally equivalent
measurements can be highly
different with respect to their
causal structure, contextuality,
fine-tuning, etc.
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Slides: pdf
Paper: pdf
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25
February (Friday) 4:15
PM ONLINE
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László
Bernáth*
Dániel Haydar Inan**
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*Institute
of Philosophy,
Research Centre for
the Humanities,
Budapest
**Institute of Philosophy, Eötvös
Loránd University,
Budapest
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| The
Transcendental
Phenomenological Argument
against Eternalism
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In this talk, we argue
against eternalism on the basis
of certain phenomenological
considerations regarding our
experiential life in a
relatively novel way. Contrary
to well-known phenomenological
arguments that attempt to refute
tenseless theories of time, our
argument that we call the
Transcendental Phenomenological
Argument against Eternalism is
against both tenseless and
tensed versions of eternalism.
The argument is based on the
fact that one experiences a
phenomenological succession of
conscious events, and it shows
that perdurantist forms of
eternalism have to either deny
this fact or should embrace ad
hoc and metaphysically
implausible assumptions about
the nature of the mind. As we
argue, neither of these options
seem to be too promising.
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