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| 4
March (Friday) 4:15 PM
Room 224 + ONLINE |
| Balázs
Gyenis |
Institute of Philosophy, Research Centre for the
Humanities,
Budapest
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Hempel's
dilemma, optimistic
meta-induction, and multiple
realization
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After stating (a
historically more appropriate
version of) Hempel's dilemma, I
argue that its pessimistic
meta-induction sub-argument misses
its target, since only a much
weaker requirement, that of future
inter-theory supervenience, would
be needed to defend currentist
physicalism against Hempel's
dilemma. This future inter-theory
supervenience is rendered likely
by what could be called as
"optimistic meta-induction", a
historical inductive argument that
is based on a strong material
premise (a la Norton). Given
future inter-theory supervenience
I also present a deductive
argument for why mental term can
not reappear as fundamental in
future physics. Finally, I give a
novel analysis of multiple
realization and argue that the
existence of multiple realization
is not only not a threat to, but
is in support of, physicalism.
(The talk is an English language,
extended version of my last year's
talk delivered at the Physicalism
workshop in the Institute of
Philosophy at HAS.)
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| 11
March (Friday) 4:15
PM Room 224
+ ONLINE |
Cristhiano
Duarte
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School of
Physics and Astronomy,
University of Leeds
International
Institute of Physics,
Brazil
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Generalising
Aumann's Agreement Theorem
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Aumann's celebrated
theorem says that a group of
agents who once shared a common
prior probability distribution
cannot assign different
posteriors to a given
proposition, should these agents
have common knowledge about
their posteriors. Put another
way, rational agents cannot
agree to disagree. Aumann's
agreement theorem was one of the
first attempts to formalise and
explore the role played by
common knowledge in decision
theory. Recently, we have seen a
resurfacing of the debate around
possible (quantum) extensions of
Aumann's results. In this
seminar, I will address yet
another contribution to this
discussion. First, as expected,
we argue that agreeing to
disagree is also impossible in
quantum theory. Secondly, and
based on the quantum argument, I
will comment that agreeing to
disagree is also forbidden in
any generalised probability
theory. To make the seminar
accessible, I will try to
introduce every element
necessary to understand our
results.
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| 18
March (Friday) 4:15 PM
Room 224 + ONLINE |
| Harry
Nicholls |
Logic and
Philosophy of Science MA
Program, Eötvös
University, Budapest
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The
Emergence of Important
Quantities Within Physics From
Perceptive Considerations
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It is
common knowledge that it takes us
longer to see the image of
something the further away it is
from us. For example, the image we
see of the sun is roughly 8
minutes old by the time we
perceive it. Does this mean that
we can consider ourselves as
perceiving through time and space
at a strictly proportional rate,
where this rate is exactly the
speed of light c? And if so, how
does this phenomenon affect how we
perceive objects with velocities
directly towards and away from us?
In this configuration we can also
consider how we, as observers, are
perceivable to such objects in a
corresponding fashion. This then
allows us to assert a certain
condition of symmetry over our
framework, from which it is
seemingly possible to derive
special relativity-like effects on
the basis of only a single
reference frame. What is the
status of such claims purporting
to an unformulated reference
frame? How can we then adapt our
framework to formulate other key
tools in special relativity into a
single reference frame? Can the
principle of relativity be
meaningfully considered without
reference to multiple reference
frames?
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