

The
seminar is held in hybrid
format, in person (Múzeum
krt. 4/i Room 224) and
online.
________________________________________________________

4
November (Friday) 4:15 PM
Room 224 + ONLINE 
Jan Faye

Department of
Communication, Section for
Philosophy
University of Copenhagen


The
implication of natural
selection on scientific
knowledge

Today naturalism in the philosophy
of science is associated with the
position that our best scientific
theories should inform philosophy.
Most people believe that
naturalism indicates that
philosophy should abandon a priori
arguments and use the same methods
and considerations as the natural
sciences use. However, very few
philosophers have realized that if
one really wants to be more than a
naturalist by name one should also
take into consideration what
evolutionary biology and cognitive
science may have to offer with
respect to human epistemology and
its possible limits.
It is among the most respected
facts within the natural sciences
that human beings have evolved by
natural election from common
ancestors whom we share with
monkeys and the great apes. This
means that our cognitive capacity
is not much different from that of
the great apes. Our cognitive
capacity is adapted to processing
sensory information from the
environment in which hominins
lived for millions of years after
our lineage to Homo sapiens and
that to the chimpanzees separated.
The main difference between us and
them is the evolution of spoken
and written language in humans,
which allows us to develop science
and technology. However, human
language evolved to express our
sensory and behavioral experiences
but it also allows us to formulate
new ideas and to develop abstract
thinking. As I see it, the man
problem in epistemology and
philosophy of science is that
human beings too often reify their
abstract thoughts by believing
that such thoughts express
knowledge about abstract objects.
In my presentation, I will discuss
these issues and explain how an
evolutionary naturalist, like
myself, views the
realistantirealist debate in
philosophy of science.


11
November (Friday) 4:15 PM
Room 224 + ONLINE 
Miklós
Hoffmann

Institute
of Mathematics and
Computer Science
Eszterházy Károly
University, Eger
Department of Computer
Graphics and Image
Processing
University of Debrecen


Who
proves a mathematical proof?

In this talk we study
the impact of the rapid
development of automatic theorem
proving and artificial
intelligence based mathematical
discovery on mathematics and, in
general, on human invention and
science as a profession. The title
of this talk intentionally refers
to an early paper of Imre Lakatos,
entitled „What does a mathematical
proof prove?”. We examine his
concept of mathematical proof, and
we explore the question of what
longterm effects this concept
have had and still have on the
everchanging role and notion of
mathematical proof.
We also consider the position of
Max Weber, who sees the essence of
scientific activity and being a
scientist, on the one hand, in
specialization and, on the other
hand, in passion. The view of
mathematical discovery as a
neverending dialectical,
performative process is of central
importance in understanding what
kind of proof we consider
forwardlooking and useful from
the point of view of mathematics.


18
November (Friday) 4:15
PM Room 224 + ONLINE

Sebastian
Horvat* and Iulian Toader**

*Faculty
of Physics, University
of Vienna
**Institute Vienna
Circle, Vienna


On
Williamson on quantum logic
and classical mathematics

Timothy Williamson has
recently argued that the
applicability of classical
mathematics in the natural and
social sciences raises a problem
for the adoption, in
nonmathematical domains, of a
wide range of nonclassical
logics, including quantum logics
(QL). In this talk, we first
reconstruct the argument and
present its restriction to the
case of QL. Then we show that
there is no inconsistency
whatsoever between applying
classical mathematics to quantum
phenomena and adopting QL in
reasoning about them.
Furthermore, after identifying
the premise in Williamson's
argument that turns out to be
false when restricted to QL, we
argue that the same premise
fails for a wider variety of
nonclassical logics. Finally,
we explain how all this relates
to the problem of mathematical
representation.




