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The
seminar is held in hybrid
format, in person (Múzeum
krt. 4/i Room 224) and
online.
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| 7
October (Friday) 4:15 PM
Room 224 + ONLINE |
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Frank
Zenker
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Department of
Philosophy, Boğaziçi
University, Bebek/Istanbul
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Theoretical
knowledge and behavioral
science
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Behavioral
science
broadly lacks theoretical
knowledge today. Some 50
years of
experimental/observational
research have not resulted
in empirically adequate
theories that allow to
explain and predict human
behavior, and to intervene
on it (e.g., in public
policy making). In
explaining this
“state-of-the-art,” I raise
three related issues. First,
a strong focus on induction
suggests a lack of
understanding among
behavioral scientists what
theoretical knowledge is,
why it is important, and why
it requires a deductive
approach. Second, the
primary aim of “making
discoveries” (by testing
against chance) leads
applications of the best
statistical inference
strategies generally, and
particularly of a Bayesian
hypothesis
support-threshold, that
typically ignore the minimum
sample size—leading to
underpowered studies the
results of which are
unlikely to replicate.
Third, since observed
behavioral responses
typically translate into
either small effects that
are quasi-unobservable or
into medium to larger
effects the observation of
which remains diffuse, the
point-effect that an
empirically adequate
theoretical construct would
have to predict is typically
unknown, partly explaining
why theoretical knowledge
cannot easily arise. For
each issue, I present
possible remedies.
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Long
Abstract (pdf)
Slides
of presentation (pdf)
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| 14
October (Friday) 4:15 PM
Room 224 + ONLINE |
Zoltán
Jakab
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Institute
for the Psychology of
Special Needs
Eötvös Loránd
University, Budapest
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Concept
acquisition: innateness,
learning, and the role of
language
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Concept learning is a
notoriously difficult topic in
cognitive science. Fodor's
famous arguments for radical
nativism were followed by
powerful responses, still some
of the problems surrounding
learning theories remain.
Somewhat relatedly, concept
nativism continues to be an
influential view in infant
research. I will discus two
important learning proposals,
with an inclination to defend
certain versions of concept
learning. The focus will be on
the theoretical possibility of
concept learning rather than on
recent empirical evidence for
nativism, although the latter
will also be touched upon.
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| 21
October (Friday) 4:15 PM
Room 224 + ONLINE |
Tomasz
Szubart
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Institute
of Philosophy,
Jagiellonian University,
Cracow
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Musical
meaning as a problem in the
philosophy of cognitive
science
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Musical meaning has been
considered a problem within the
philosophy of music since
Pythagoras. Over the centuries,
several theories have been
proposed, and the discussion
reached an impasse at the end of
the XX century. Recent
developments in the cognitive
sciences of music suggest that
musical meaning could be
understood in terms of syntax and
semantics, similar to linguistic
meaning. The aim of this paper is
to (1) shortly describe basic
philosophical theories of musical
meaning, (2) critically review
selected studies in the cognitive
neuroscience of musical meaning,
and (3) identify some problems in
the field of philosophy of
cognitive science that might need
a resolution first, in order to
provide an integrated naturalistic
theory of musical meaning.
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