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10 December 4:00 PM Room 226
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Rosen Lutskanov
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Institute for Philosophical Research, Sofia
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The meaning of logical constants in proof-theoretic semantics
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According to the
classical Tarskian semantics the logical constants are precisely
those elements of the language L that receive fixed meaning in all
domains of interpretation. On that account their topically neutral
meaning is fixed by the analytically true propositions included in
the recursive definition of the predicate “true in L”. This
approach has two serious disadvantages: (1) the above mentioned
definition of the notion “logical constant” involves implicit
quantification over the class of all sets; (2) the clear demarcation
between the properly logical and the signifying elements of the
language is hard to be retained in view of Quine’s influential
attack against the analytic / synthetic distinction. In my
presentation I’ll try to show that if we switch to the theoretical
framework of proof-theoretic semantics the meaning of the notion of
logical constant becomes much clearer: to the properly logical part
of the language belong those elements of the underlying language that
obey some easy specifiable structural requirements. The merit of this
approach is that if we turn to some type of dynamic logic we may view
the meaning of logical constants as something which is not given from
the outset but develops in the process of the revision of the
extension of the predicate “provable proposition”. Such
reconstruction provides strong support for the claim of the
quasi-empirical character of logical knowledge.
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17 December 4:00 PM Room 226
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Attila Tanyi
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Department of Philosophy, University of Stockholm
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Reason and Desire: the Role of Pleasure
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The
paper begins with a well-known objection to the idea that reasons for
action are provided by human desires. The objection holds that since
desires are based on reasons (first thesis), which they transmit but to
which they cannot add (second thesis), they cannot themselves provide
reasons for action. In the paper I investigate an attack that has
recently been launched against the first thesis. It invokes a
counterexample: hedonic desires, i.e. desires for the pleasure that
attaining the object of the desire brings. The aim of the paper is to
defend the thesis by bringing the alleged counterexample under its
scope. I first point out that reference to hedonic desires as a
counterexample presupposes a particular understanding of pleasure,
which we might call desire-based. In response I draw up two alternative
accounts, the phenomenological and the tracking views. Although several
objections can be raised to both accounts, I argue in detail that they
are not as implausible as their opponents claim them to be.
Related paper:
Reason and Desire: The Role of Pleasure and Pain
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