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| 2 May (Wednesday)
5:00
PM
Room
226 |
| Márton Gömöri
|
Institute
of Philosophy, Eötvös
University, Budapest
|
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|
Ontological incompleteness of classical electrodynamics
|
What
does it take to be an entity existing in space and time? As an answer to
this question, a formal condition is suggested in terms of classical
physics. It is shown, however, that the electromagnetic field, or even a
local part of it, does not meet this condition in classical
electrodynamics.
Related paper:
http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/8784
|
| 9 May (Wednesday)
5:00
PM
Room
226 |
| Gábor Hofer-Szabó
|
Institute for Communication and Cultural Studies, King Sigismund College, Budapest
|
|
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Bell inequality in algebraic quantum field theory
|
In the
talk it will be argued that the violation of the Bell inequality in
algebraic quantum field theory does not exclude a common causal
explanation of a set of quantum correlations if we abandon commutativity
between the common cause and the correlating events. Moreover, it will
turn out that the common cause is local, i.e. localizable in the common
past of the correlating events. It will be argued furthermore that
giving up commutativity helps to maintain the validity of Reichenbach's
Common Cause Principle in algebraic quantum field theory.
Related paper:
http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/9101
|
| 16 May (Wednesday)
5:00
PM
Room
226 |
| János Tanács
|
Department
of
Philosophy
and
the
History
of
Science
Budapest
University of Technology and Economics
|
|
|
A Bolyaiak absurdum-vezérelt helyettesítési kísérletei a Párhuzamosok Problémájának megoldására
(The absurdum-guided methodology of the two Bolyais in the attacking of the Euclidean Parallel Postulate)
|
Az előadás keretében azt próbálom megmutatni, hogy a Bolyaiak reductio ad absurdum
eljárásként számon tartott módszere nem logikai ellentmondás keresésére
irányult, következésképpen nem cáfolási funkciót töltött be. Mindez a
Párhuzamosok Problémájával összefüggésben a két Bolyai megoldásai
kísérleteinek újragondolását kívánja meg.
|
| 23 May (Wednesday)
5:00
PM
Room
226 |
| Peter Rowlands
|
Science Communication Unit, University of Liverpool
|
|
|
How Schrödinger’s cat escaped the box
|
Quantum
mechanics has often been presented as a strange and undesirable way of
doing physics, one that we have to use for calculation, but that makes
no physical sense. Many people have supported Einstein in his view that
physics ought to be about real particles communicating with each other
at a finite speed. However, the deeper we penetrate the more it seems
that quantum mechanics presents us not with a problem, but rather an
opportunity, because it gives us a key to understanding nature at a
deeper philosophical level. The aim of this presentation is to suggest
an idea of how we might approach this way of thinking and of what kind
of results we might expect.
|
| 30 May (Wednesday)
5:00
PM
Room
226 |
| Karim Bschir
|
Institute of Philosophy, Leibniz University, Hannover
on leave from
Department of Humanities, Social and Political Sciences, ETH Zurich
|
|
|
The Implications of Szabó's Physicalist Account of Mathematical Truth for Scientific Realism
|
László
Szabó's physicalist account of mathematical truth leads to the
remarkable epistemological consequence that there is no higher degree of
certainty in mathematics than the one generated through empirical
inductive generalizations. Accordingly, all knowledge, mathematical
knowledge included, must be seen as empirical knowledge. We will
elaborate the implications of this account for the debate on scientific
realism. The upshot of our analysis will be that even ontological
knowledge, i.e. knowledge about what there is, is bounded by the limits
of induction, and that an old lesson still holds true: Strict
empiricists have to bite the bullet of ontological relativity.
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