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| 8 May (Wednesday)
5:00
PM
Room
226 |
| Réka Markovich
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Department
of Logic,
Institute of
Philosophy
Eötvös
University, Budapest
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Modalities, operators, actions
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In
Handbook of Philosophical Logic Åqvist referred to deontic logic as the
domain of which there is no issue that could be considered as a cleared
one. Sure enough, several questions are waiting for clarification. I am
primarily interested in describing law with formal semantic tools. I am
convinced our success depends on what modalities we consider, what
operators we use, and what description of actions we work with.
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| 15 May (Wednesday)
5:00
PM
Room
226 |
| László E. Szabó
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Department
of Logic,
Institute of
Philosophy
Eötvös
University, Budapest
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| "The laws of physics have the same form in all inertial frames of reference." |
This is the special principle of relativity in its most widespread formulation.
While there is a longstanding discussion about the interpretation of
the extended, general principle of relativity, there seems to be a
consensus that the above quoted special principle of relativity is
absolutely unproblematic.
In my talk, I will challenge this view through an analysis of the
precise meaning of the statement. The analysis will be based on a
precise and general mathematical formulation of the principle. It will
be seen, however, that the main difficulties are not formal or
mathematical in nature, but rather conceptual. What is counted as a “law
of physics” here -- for example, the Maxwell equations, or a Coulomb
solution, describing a concrete physical situation? How to identify a
physical law, and how to identify its counterpart in another reference
frame? What does it take to be of the “same form”? -- one and the same
physical law can be expressed in different, but logically equivalent
forms. In what sense can a law of physics be “in” an inertial frame of
reference? How do we identify a physical quantity, and how do we
identify its counterpart in another reference frame? If they are
identified by means of their operational definitions, how are the
etalons and the measuring devices shared between the different reference
frames? Under what physical conditions can two measuring devices -- one
being at rest in one inertial frame, the other being at rest in another
inertial frame -- be regarded as the same measuring device in the same
(pointer-position) state? -- and, the similar question about the
physical objects to be measured. After all, under what conditions can a
physical object or phenomenon -- Galileo's fishes, butterflies, and
smokes -- be regarded as being “in” or “co-moving with” an inertial
frame of reference? In fact, some of these questions do not have a
satisfactory answer.
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| 22 May (Wednesday)
5:00
PM
Room
226 |
| Gábor Hofer-Szabó
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Institute of Philosophy
Research Center for the Humanities
Hungarian Academy of Sciences
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Local causality
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In the talk we are trying to spell out Bell's original characterization of local causality in an algebraic field theoretical setting.
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