|
|
|
|
8
April (Wednesday)
5:00 PM Room
226
|
Krisztina
Orbán*
Hong Yu Wong** |
*Department
of Philosophy,
Birkbeck,
University of
London
**Philosophy
of Neuroscience, Centre
for Integrative
Neuroscience, University
of Tuebingen
|
|
The Zero
Standpoint View on
Awareness of Oneself
‘From the Inside’
|
There
is a natural distinction
between external and
internal perception. Vision,
audition and touch are modes
of perception of objects in
the world, including the
subject. One can look at
one’s own hand, hear one’s
own voice or rub one’s own
eyes. Such perception is not
perception from the inside.
This we call external
perception. In contrast,
internal perception (e.g.
proprioception,
kinaesthesia, and
nociception) is perception
from the inside. Internal
perception is perception of
parts or features of the
subject of perception, but
only for the subject –
assuming a natural design.
We will point out an
asymmetry between external
(e.g. vision) and internal
(e.g. proprioception)
perception in terms of the
notion of frame of
reference. We will argue
that perception of objects
(including the subject)
through external perception
is standpoint relative,
while internal perception of
parts and features of the
subject is not. The first
kind of frame of reference
is a Standpoint-relative one
and the second is the
Zero-standpoint frame of
reference.
The Zero-standpoint view has
an interesting implication.
An object presented through
external perception is open
to the Frege Puzzle.
External perception allows
that an object can be
experienced from different
spatial standpoints. This
opens the possibility of
error where one and the same
object can be thought to be
different because it is
experienced from two
different spatial
standpoints. In contrast,
the subject cannot seem to
be a different object from a
different standpoint ‘from
the inside’, because there
is no distinct standpoint to
be had. The thought is that
the subject presented
through internal perception
is not presented from a
spatial standpoint which
opens the possibility that
the object so perceived
could seem to be distinct
from the object that the
subject is. Rather, the
subject is always already
presented in a first-person
fashion through internal
perception. This has
powerful consequences for
first person thought and for
understanding immunity to
error through
misidentification relative
to ‘I’.
|
15
April (Wednesday)
5:00 PM
Room 226
|
Márton Gömöri
|
Department
of Logic,
Institute of
Philosophy
Eötvös University
Budapest
|
|
Only
conjunction
|
| Probability
theory will be
reformulated in terms
of an event structure
endowed only with
conjunction
operation---no
disjunction and
negation.
Philosophical
motivations and
elementary technical
results will be
discussed. |
22
April (Wednesday)
5:00 PM Room
226
|
Gergő Orbán
|
Department
of Theoretical Physics
Wigner Research Centre
for Physics, Budapest
|
|
|
|
Perception
is a process that is
inherently uncertain:
limited or partial sensory
data renders interpretations
ambiguous, while variability
in either in the environment
or the sensory apparatus
appears as noise in the
inference process. Efficient
computations under
uncertainty entail
probabilistic approaches. A
crucial component of
probabilistic inference is
the integration of prior
knowledge with sensory
evidence: in order to draw
inferences about the
features of the environment
biological agents need to
rely on their expectations
about (co-)occurrences of
environmental features.
While under simple
circumstances these
expectations are invariable
across individuals, more
complex stimuli/tasks
suggest individual
differences. We will explore
how these individual
differences can be revealed
and will investigate if
these can account for the
variable choices of
individuals.
|
29
April (Wednesday)
5:00 PM
Room 226
|
György Szondy
|
|
How
generalized
four-force
leads to
scalar-tensor
gravity
|
In
Special Relativity
Minkowski four-force
is known to be
perpendicular to the
four-velocity and
four-momentum vector.
In the ‘50s Károly
Novobátzky worked out
the generalization of
this four-force. We
will shortly explain
how this formalism can
be used to describe
conservative fields
and how it leads to a
Scalar-Tensor gravity
that also fits the
mathematical
background of GPS.
We will also explain
how this approach
leads (by applying two
well-known
transformations) to
express the scalar
field from the scalar
curvature of the
metric tensor – the
goal that has been
missed by Brans and
Dicke. |
|
|
|
