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17 September (Wednesday)
5:00
PM
Room
226
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János Kelemen
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| Department of General Philosophy, Institute of Philosophy, Eötvös University, Budapest |
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Lukács György nyelv- és tudományfilozófiá(i)
(Georg Lukács's philosophy(ies) of language and science)
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Az
előadás a szerző „The Rationalism of Georg Lukács” (Palgrave Macmillan,
New York, 2014) c. könyvét mutatja be. Elemzi „Az ész trónfosztása”
racionalitás- és racionalizmus-koncepcióját, összevetve azt a popperi
felfogással és a mai koncepciókkal. Kitér az „irracionalizmus
paradoxonára” (Lukács) és az „irracionalitás paradoxonára” (Davidson).
Ebben a keretben tárgyalja Lukács tudomány-elméletét és
„nyelvfilozófiáját” a filozófus korai korszakától az Ontológiáig.
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| 24 September (Wednesday)
5:00
PM
Room
226 |
Samuel C. Fletcher
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Logic and Philosophy of Science, University of California, Irvine
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On the Reduction of General Relativity to Newtonian Gravitation
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Intertheoretic
reduction in physics aspires to be both perfectly general and to be
explanatory: it aims to relate or otherwise account for as many features
of the two theories as possible, and it endeavors to explain why the
older, simpler theory to which the other reduces continues to be as
successful as it is. Despite often being introduced as straightforward
cases of intertheoretic reduction, candidate accounts of the reduction
of general relativity (GR) to Newtonian gravitation (NG) have either
been insufficiently general, or have not clearly been able to explain
the empirical success of NG, such as it is. Building on work by Ehlers
and others, I propose a different account of the reduction relation that
is perfectly general and meets the explanatory demand one would make of
it. In doing so, I highlight the role that a topology on the collection
of all spacetimes plays in denying the relation, and how the choice of
topology corresponds with broader or narrower classes of observables
that one demands be well-approximated in the limit.
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