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| 14
November
(Wednesday) 5:30
PM Room 226 |
Ferenc
Huoranszki
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Department
of Philosophy, CEU,
Budapest
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The
Contingency of Physical
Laws
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It is often claimed that
Hume has proved that the laws of
physics cannot be metaphysically
and/or conceptually necessary. In
this talk I shall argue, first,
that Hume did not, and given his
theory of content could not,
provide such a proof; and second,
that the Best System Account (BSA)
of physical laws is incompatible
with Hume’s theory of semantic
content. Finally, I will offer an
alternative explanation of
contingency, based on a
re-interpretation of the
supervenience of the macroscopic
on the microphysical.
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| 21
November
(Wednesday) 5:00
PM Room 226 |
Thomas
Filk
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Institute of
Physics, University of Freiburg
Parmenides Foundation, Munich
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Generalizing
Quantum Theory
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"Generalizing quantum
theory" has two aspects: To
redefine fundamental
concepts of quantum theory -
like superposition,
complementarity, eigenstates,
entanglement, pure and mixed
states, non-commuting observables,
contextuality, etc. -in such
a way that they do no longer
depend on a vector (Hilbert)-space
formalism and can be applied also
to other fields. A second approach
is the application of the quantum
formalism (including the vector
space representation) to fields
outside the realm of physics, like
the social sciences or psychology.
Both aspects will be elaborated in
my talk. I will also mention
briefly a third approach - the
generalization of the axioms for
observables in a quantum theory
(this approach became originally
known as "weak quantum theory“), -
however, in my opinion this third
approach has failed because
already simple models of
"observables" cannot be
implemented into this framework.
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| 28
November
(Wednesday) 5:00
PM Room 226 |
Márta
Ujvári
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| Corvinus
University of Budapest
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Explanation,
Individual Essence and the
Identity of Indiscernibles
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The novel
ontic reading of explanation
intending to capture the real
nature of concrete things can
support the essentialist approach
to these things. Specific essences
are accepted by contemporary
neo-Aristotelian metaphysics; the
motivation to postulate
qualitative individual essences on
top of the specific ones also lies
in their explanatory value:
qualitative individual essences
can capture the de re
essential features of individuals.
However, this
qualitative-essentialist view of
individuals meets a challenge in
the form of the Leibnizian
principle of the Identity of
Indiscernibles (PII). It will be
shown in the talk that the
putative harmful consequences of
(PII) and its converse for the
qualitative view can be avoided,
provided that individual essences
are not construed in the style of
the naïve bundle theory with
set-theoretical identity
conditions. Adopting either the
more sophisticated two-tier BT,
or, alternatively, the
neo-Aristotelian position of
taking essences as natures in the
Aristotelian sense, can help to
evade this main charge against the
qualitative view. Thus, it can be
concluded that the fate of the
qualitative-essentialist view of
individuals does not hinge on the
tenability of (PII).
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