ELTE TTK, Budapest Pázmány P. sétány
1/A.
_____________________
1999, december
December 13 |
12:30 |
6. em. 6.54 |
|
|
Ambrus-Lakatos
Loránd
|
CEU,Departments
of Political Science and Economics
|
|
Van
Fraassen on Empiricism versus Pragmatism in Epistemology
|
|
In his paper "Belief
and the Will", Bastian van Fraassen presents a framework for the understanding
of Empiricist epistemology, and this is the model of Bayesian information
processing. Analyzing this framework, he continues, makes us realize that
one also has to posit that the Empiricist owes a certain sort of commitment
to his own epistemic stances. And this in turn raises the issue of how
the Empiricist could make practical decisions concerning what his correct
beliefs should be. I argue, however, that the model of Bayesian information
processing cannot in general serve the purpose of being a model for Empiricist
epistemology. My argument employs a close inspection of the implicit epistemological
presuppositions behind the Bayesian model. It also involves a discussion
of the implications of the so-called Harsanyi doctrine for the formulation
of the Bayesian decision problem. |
|
Ha mindenki beszél magyarul, akkor az elõadás
magyarul lesz! |
|