History and Philosophy of Science
Eötvös University, Budapest
Philosophy of Science Colloquium
Room 6.54 (6th floor) Monday 4:00 PM
Pázmány P. sétány 1/A  Budapest Phone/Fax: (36-1) 372 2924 Location?

>>> Printable poster (pdf)


December                           Preliminary!
2005


5 December  4:00 PM   6th floor 6.54
Katalin Balog
Philosophy, Yale University
Collegium Budapest
 
The Constitutional Account of Phenomenal Concepts
This paper is about phenomenal consciousness and phenomenal concepts. It has seemed very difficult to many philosophers (and neuroscientists and psychologists, etc.) to understand how there could be a physical or biological account of phenomenal consciousness. It strikes many as virtually impossible that the motions of molecules, the firing of neurons, the execution of functionally organized processes, and so forth, is or constitutes phenomenal consciousness. It is the primary aim of this paper to sketch an account of phenomenal concepts - the concepts we employ to phenomenal states in direct experience of them - which explains this incredulity within the physicalist framework by explaining how the supposedly intractable features of phenomenal consciousness are actually due to the nature of these concepts.
My view is that the representations that we directly apply to our own phenomenal states, and the concepts we derive from these representations play a unique role in our cognitive economy. Phenomenal experience and our representations of it are intimately related; they are "two sides of the same coin". The mental representations we apply to our own conscious experience are partly constituted by these experiences and conscious experience essentially involves these representations. For example, a feeling of pain is partly constitutive of a representation that represents itself. This idea explains why, as many philosophers note, the appearance of pain is pain. It also explains, as I show in the paper, why psychophysical identities never "feel" satisfactory, why they are unexplanatory, even if they are true.


12 December  4:00 PM   6th floor 6.54
Hanoch Ben-Yami
Philosophy, Central European University, Budapest
 
Causality and Temporal Order in Special Relativity
David Malament (Nous 1977) tried to show that the causal theory of time leads to a unique determination of simultaneity relative to an inertial observer, namely standard simultaneity. I show that the causal relation Malament uses in his proofs, causal connectibility, should be replaced by a different causal relation, the one used by Reichenbach in his formulation of the theory. I also explain why Malament's reliance on the assumption that the observer has an eternal inertial history modifies our conception of simultaneity, and I therefore eliminate it. Having made these changes, Malament's uniqueness result no longer follows, although the conventionality of simultaneity is not reinstated.
 

19 December  4:00 PM   6th floor 6.54
Axel Gelfert
Department of History and Philosophy of Science, University of Cambridge
 Collegium Budapest
 
Mathematical rigor and mathematical models
The role and function of scientific models continues to be a topic of intense debate in the philosophy of science. On one influential interpretation, models are to be regarded as independent 'mediators' between theory and data. I argue that a careful consideration of the role of mathematically rigorous results is necessary if the 'mediator view' is to be developed into an adequate account of mathematical models in science. As an example, I discuss the use of many-body models in condensed-matter physics. Such models, I argue, are frequently assessed by their conformity to mathematically rigorous results and relations, and not primarily by their performance in specific empirical contexts, as the mediator view would demand. Moreover, rigorous results may provide cross-model justification, which is not adequately captured by the traditional mediator view. Since rigorous results are typically due to a model's intrinsic mathematical structure, I argue that models are best regarded as contributors to scientific inquiry, on a par with theory and data, rather than as auxiliary mediators between theory and data.



The colloquium is open to everyone, including students, visitors, and faculty members from all departments!

The 60-minute lecture is followed by a 10-minute break. Then we hold a 30-60-minute discussion. The language of the presentation is indicated in the following way:
         English
   English, except if all participants speak Hungarian
         Hungarian
The participants may comment on the talks and are encouraged to initiate discussion through the Internet. The comments  should be written in the language of the presentation.

The organizer of the colloquium: László E. Szabó  (email: leszabo@hps.elte.hu)