A historical introduction to the philosophy of mathematics Spring Semester 2025

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$\label{eq:webpage:https://lps.elte.hu/andras/matfil/matfil.html Presentations will be posted after the classes.$



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Closing and grades:

The course will conclude with a conference on the philosophy of mathematics.

To receive a grade, you must give a presentation on a topic related to the course theme.

During the lectures, I will mention some possible topics (but there are other options).

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This picture about mathematics may be called the $\underline{\text{dogmatic}}$ view.

Plato about mathematics: a sceptic view

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Figures or *calculi* (small stones used to represent numbers) are just auxiliary tools to help our reason.

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Fundamental truths are based on the properties of human cognitive capacity.

Problems and tendencies in 19th century mathematics 1.: Calculus

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Differential- and integral calculus is the most successful area of applied mathematics. But it lacks a solid, Euclidean foundation.

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Comment by Bolzano: first, it must be proved that there is a number which is the sum of the series.

Bolzano on infinite quantities

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Bolzano: the paradoxes of infinite(ly small or large) quantities can be resolved by scrupulous (re-)defining basic concepts and proving everything what seems to be obvious.

Bolzano on infinite manifolds

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Bolzano proves at length and scrupulously way that this difficulty cannot be circumvented.

His conclusion: The paradoxes of infinite manifolds cannot be solved at all.

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Theory of infinite sets, infinite cardinals and ordinals.

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Remaining problems

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How to define the natural numbers?

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How to define the natural numbers?

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Is the Cantorian concept of set as clear and well supported as it seems to be?

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Take a line on the plane and a point that is not contained by this line. Then there is one and only one line that contains the point and does not intersect the previous line (this the parallel).

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18th century: several attempts to prove the axiom (typically by contradiction).

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About twenty years later the equiconsistency of Euclidean and Bolyai-Lobachevsky-geometry is proved (Cayley-Klein model). It is therefore impossible to decide which is the true science of the space.

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Problems in geometry B.: Hidden axioms in Euclid

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- independent of the other axioms;
- needed for some theorems of Euclid;
- never stated explicitly in the *Elements*.

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Problems and tendencies 3.: Algebra

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A substantial change of the views about the objects of mathematics and mathematical truth.

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Logical perfection

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Philosophy of mathematics: poses problems and proposes (hypothetical) answers.

Research into the foundations of mathematics: to support or refute such answers.