The metalogical use of Markov-algorithms Logical calculi

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Be \mathcal{A} an alphabet. F is a <u>definite</u> subclass of \mathcal{A}° iff there is a Markov algorithm N over some alphabet $\mathcal{B} \supseteq \mathcal{A}$ and a w \mathcal{B} -string s. t. N is applicable to every f \mathcal{A} -string and $f \in F$ iff N(f) = w.

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Markov thesis: Every effective procedure can be simulated by a Markov algorithm and every Markov algorithm is an effective procedure. Therefore, 'definite' and 'decidable' is the same. This is an *empirical* proposition that can be reinforced (although not proved) or refuted by examples.

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Theorem 1: Let us have an algorithm N over some alphabet $\mathcal{B} \supseteq \mathcal{A}$ that is applicable for every \mathcal{A} -string. Then we can construct a calculus K over some $\mathcal{C} \supseteq \mathcal{B}$ using a code letter $\mu \in \mathcal{C} - \mathcal{B}$ such that for all x \mathcal{A} -string and y \mathcal{B} -string, N(x) = y iff $K \mapsto x\mu y$.

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Proof: Be $N = \langle C_1, C_2, \dots C_n \rangle$. The calculus K will be the union of the calculi $K_1, K_2, \dots K_n$ associated to the commands of N plus a calculus K_0 .

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If C_i is of the form $u_i \to v_i$ or $u_i \to .v_i$, where $u_i = b_1 b_2 ... b_k$, then the calculus K_i will be this:

$$i1. \quad \Delta_{i1}x$$

$$i2. \quad x\Delta_{i1}by \to xb\Delta_{i1}y$$

$$b \in \mathcal{B} - \{b_1\}$$

$$i3. \quad x\Delta_{ij}by \to x\Delta_{i1}by$$

$$b \in \mathcal{B} - \{b_j\}, 1 \le j \le k$$

$$i4. \quad x\Delta_{ij}b_jy \to xb_j\Delta_{i,j+1}y$$

$$1 \le j \le k$$

$$i5. \quad x\Delta_{ij} \to \Delta_{i0}x$$

$$1 \leq j \leq k$$

$$i6. \quad xu_i\Delta_{i,k+1}y \to xu_iy\Delta^ixv_iy$$

$$(\Delta^i, \Delta_{i0}, \Delta_{i1}, \dots \Delta_{ik}, \Delta_{i,k+1} \text{ are auxiliary letters.})$$

Proof(continuation2)

The calculus K_0 :

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$$x\Delta^1 y \to xZy$$

2.
$$\Delta_{10}x \to x\Delta^2y \to xZy$$

3.
$$\Delta_{10}x \to \Delta_{20}x \to x\Delta^3y \to xZy$$

. . .

$$i+1. \quad \Delta_{10}x \to \ldots \to \Delta_{i0}x \to x\Delta^{i+1}y \to xZy$$

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$$n. \quad \Delta_{10}x \to \ldots \to \Delta_{n-1,0}x \to x\Delta^n y \to xZy$$

$$n+1$$
. $xMy \rightarrow yMz \rightarrow xMz$

$$n+2$$
. $xMy \rightarrow y\mu z \rightarrow x\mu z$

where in the *i*th rule $(1 \le i \le n)$ Z stands for μ if C_i is a stop command and for M if it is not.



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Now the calculus K is ready.



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Proof: Let the deciding algorithm for F be N over $\mathcal{B} \supseteq \mathcal{A}$, $w \in \mathcal{B}^{\circ}$ such that

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Be K the calculus representing N according to the the previous theorem (\mathcal{C} , μ like in the previous theorem, too.) Then for any $f \in \mathcal{A}^{\circ}$, $N(f) = g \Leftrightarrow K \mapsto f \mu g$.

Then N(f) = w iff $K \mapsto x\mu w$. Let us add the rule $x\mu w \to x$ to K to get the calculus K'. From the proof of the previous theorem you can see that K derives no \mathcal{A} -string, therefore K' derives \mathcal{A} -strings by using this last rule only.

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Therefore, for any A-string f,

$$f \in F \Leftrightarrow N(f) = w \Leftrightarrow K \mapsto f\mu w \Leftrightarrow K' \mapsto f.$$

I.e., K' defines inductively F.



A decision algorithm for some string class \mathcal{A} can be modified to an algorithm that decides its complement class (for the class of \mathcal{A} -strings). (See the identifying algorithm.) Therefore, if a string class is definite, then both the class itself and its complement are inductive ones.

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According to the Markov thesis, decidable classes are the same as definite classes. Therefore, if a class is decidable, then both the class and its complement are inductive classes. We have seen earlier the converse of this claim. Hence, a string class F is decidable if and only if both F and its complement are inductive classes.

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We have proven (3rd October presentation) that the class of autonomous numerals Aut is inductive, but its complement for the class of all numerals, i. e. the class of non-autonomous numerals is not inductive. Therefore, it is not decidable.

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Inductive rules (rules of deduction, proof rules) prescribe how you can arrive from some given relations $\Gamma \vdash A_1, \Gamma \vdash A_2, \ldots$ to some new relation $\Gamma \vdash A$.



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A natural demand for the class of logical axioms and the rules of deduction: they should be decidable.