Objective Modalities

Williamson:Modal Science

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It contradicts to my (*) view.

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Redundant truth is a limiting case of objective modalities (both necessity and possibility).

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Scheme S4: $\Box\alpha \longrightarrow \Box\Box\alpha$ holds for metaphysical necessity because $\Box_m\Box_m$ is an objective necessity.

In other words, metaphysical accessibility is transitive.

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In other words again: is metaphysical necessity S5 ?
A condition that would suffice: Is the converse of an objective accessibility relation an objective accessibility relation?
A weakening: For every w' metaphysical alternative of the actual world w, w is a metaphysical alternative of w'.
It would imply "local S5-ness" of the actual world, i. e. every S5-validity would hold in the actual world.

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Williamson gives a logic of metaphysical necessity that offers a wide range of possible notions (different grades of essentialism.)