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The
seminar is held in hybrid
format, in person (Múzeum
krt. 4/i Room 224) and
online at the following
link:
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| 15
May (Friday) 4:15
PM Room 224 + ONLINE
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Aleksandra
Shvindt
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Department
of Logic, Institute of
Philosophy,
Eötvös Loránd University,
Budapest
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Truth
and Justification in the
Putnam-Rorty Debate
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This presentation
examines the debate between Hilary
Putnam and Richard Rorty over the
relationship between truth and
justification. Both philosophers
reject metaphysical realism and
deny any "God’s Eye perspective,"
yet they reach strikingly
different conclusions. Putnam
insists on a normative gap between
what a community is warranted in
believing and what is true,
arguing that without it there is
no stable concept of rational
reform. Rorty counters that
preserving the gap covertly
reinstates the
community-independent standard
both have agreed to abandon. The
aim of this presentation is to
reconstruct the central
disagreement between Putnam and
Rorty concerning truth and
justification, and to examine
whether this disagreement leads to
substantially different
philosophical or practical
consequences. I will suggest that,
despite the theoretical sharpness
of the dispute, the practical
implications of their positions
for philosophical inquiry and
democratic conversation may be
less substantial than either
philosopher sometimes suggests.
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