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The
seminar is held in hybrid
format, in person (Múzeum
krt. 4/i Room 224) and
online at the following
link:
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| 7
November (Friday) 4:15
PM Room 224 + ONLINE
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Gergely
Ambrus
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Department of General
Philosophy, Institute of
Philosophy
Eötvös Loránd University,
Budapest
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| Personal
Identity and Memory
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According to one major
philosophical tradition, our
personal identity over time is
grounded in memory. This
view—associated with figures
such as Locke, Hume, and
Russell—was developed into its
most elaborate form by Parfit
(1984). He argued that the
criterion of our identity over
time is psychological
continuity, and that memory
plays an essential,
indispensable role in
establishing this continuity.
In this talk, I will examine to
what extent Parfit’s
reductionist concept of the
person and his relational
interpretation of personal
identity can be maintained in
light of different conceptions
and theories of memory. I will
discuss the objection that
Parfit’s criterion is either
circular or cannot account for
the phenomenological features of
episodic autobiographic
memories, in particular their
autonoetic nature and being
immune to error through
misidentification (based on
Schechtman and Zahavi). Besides,
I will briefly address
objections to the storehouse
model of memory and consider a
recent alternative to the causal
theory of memory, the
simulationist theory.
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| 14
November (Friday)
4:15 PM Room 224 +
ONLINE |
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Győző Egri
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Faulhorn
Labs, Budapest
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| Introduction
to Zero Knowledge Proofs
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We are all familiar with the
concept of mathematical proofs,
and it seems natural that
verifying a proof requires
reading it in its entirety. In
this talk, I will take a more
liberal view of what we mean by
proofs and verification. This
perspective will lead us to
proof systems in which for
example verification can be
performed in constant
time—independent of the number
of steps required for the proof.
I will explain how and why this
idea is important for real-world
applications.
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| 21
November (Friday)
4:15 PM Room 224 +
ONLINE |
| Ákos
Blaskovics
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Department
of Logic, Institute of
Philosophy,
Eötvös Loránd University,
Budapest
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| Paradigmatic
effects in Hungarian
accusative suffixation
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Accusative forms
in Hungarian end in -(o/a/e/ö)t:
some words require the addition of
a linking vowel before the final
-t, others not. For words ending
in a single consonant, this can
mostly be determined based on
phonological context and paradigm
class. However, for words ending
in a consonant cluster, patterns
look more complex. In specific
cases, there is variation as to
whether a linking vowel is added
or not, and the degree of
variation across different groups
seems to be systematic. According
to the explanation I will give,
there are both inter- and
intra-paradigmatic reasons for the
different degrees of variation.
The related corpus data will also
be examined using regression
models as well as further
possibilities for phonological
analysis will be considered.
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| 28
November (Friday)
4:15 PM Room 224 +
ONLINE |
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Miklós Rédei
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Department
of Philosophy, Logic and
Scientific Method, LSE, London
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| Conditionally
inaccessible decisions
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We define a notion
of conditional inaccessibility of
a decision between two actions
represented by two utility
functions, where the decision is
based on the order of the expected
values of the two utility
functions calculated by a
probability measure p: The action
with higher expectation value is
preferred. The conditional
inaccessibility expresses that the
decision cannot be reached if the
expectation values of the utility
functions are calculated using the
(Jeffrey) conditional probability
defined by a prior and by partial
evidence about the probability p.
Examples of conditionally
inaccessible decisions will be
given in some probability spaces
having a finite number of
elementary events. Open questions
and conjectures about conditional
inaccessibility of decisions are
formulated. The phenomenon of
conditional inaccessibility of
decisions is interpreted as
showing another aspect of the
crucial role of priors in Bayesian
taming of epistemic uncertainties
about probabilities that determine
decisions based on utility
maximizing. The talk is based on
joint work with H. Jing.
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