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The
seminar is held in hybrid
format, in person (Múzeum
krt. 4/i Room 224) and
online at the following
link:
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| 3
October (Friday) 4:15
PM Room 224 + ONLINE
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Antoine
Soulas
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Institute for Quantum Optics
and Quantum Information,
Austrian Academy of Sciences,
Vienna
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| An
interpretation-independent
formulation of the
measurement problem
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In this
presentation, I do not try to
solve the measurement problem, but
rather to properly formulate it.
One of the reasons why it still
lacks a precise, agreed definition
is that the problem may take very
different forms depending on the
interpretation of QM embraced. I
propose to identify the common
root of the puzzle in an
interpretation-independent way
(i.e. as a property of the
probabilities only) and derive its
philosophical consequences. The
key point is that the violation of
the total probability formula in
QM does not allow to construct an
objective ontology, independent
from epistemology. This enables
to: (i) better compare the
different interpretations of QM;
(ii) propose a reason why QM and
GR are so fundamentally
incompatible, not relying on
purely mathematical or technical
arguments.
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| 10
October (Friday) 4:15
PM Room 224 + ONLINE
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Gergő
Gila
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Department
of Logic, Institute of
Philosophy
Eötvös Loránd University,
Budapest
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| Platonic
Realism and the Early
Analytics
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In this
presentation I explore the
intersection of Platonic realism
and early analytic philosophy,
focusing on the works of Frege,
Russell and Wittgenstein, with a
particular focus on Wittgenstein's
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus.
The central argument focuses on
Wittgenstein's Tractatus,
examining whether his own
self-admittedly anti-metaphysical
position implies a kind of
‘reluctant’ Platonism. I critique
the established interpretations
that portray Wittgenstein as a
strict nominalist or anti-realist
and propose an alternative view;
that Wittgenstein's conception of
logical space and the intrinsic
properties of objects implicitly
affirm the existence of abstract
entities. After an examination of
the Tractatus and the literature
from different interpretive
traditions, I propose an argument
that Wittgenstein's internal
properties, logical forms and
especially tautologies and
contradictions as elements of
logical space that exist but are
not found in the physical world,
suggest a realist framework. While
it is true that Wittgenstein
rejects the existence of entities
such as Frege's truth-values or
Russell's universals as Platonic
entities, the structure of logical
space makes it contradictory to
view it as a non-abstractly real
structure.
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