Location






The seminar is held in hybrid format, in person (Múzeum krt. 4/i Room 224) and online at the following link:

https://us02web.zoom.us/j/84594385686?pwd=a7KPWoNLrPg11xNTi5Ug91YR5mHmmS.1
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4 December  (Friday) 4:15 PM  Room 224 + ONLINE 
Dániel Kodaj
Department of General Philosophy, Institute of Philosophy
Eötvös Loránd University, Budapest
 
AI vs. incompleteness/inexpressibility
Going back to John Lucas and Roger Penrose, a number of people have used Gödel’s first incompleteness theorem to argue that the mind is not a mechanism and AI cognition is in some sense inferior to human cognition. I will argue that this demarcation argument is extremely limited even if it is sound; among other things, it presupposes an older, pre-LLM paradigm. On a more constructive note, I will defend two different but loosely related cases against AI cognition. The first appeals to Rice’s theorem while the second is based on a theorem about the inability of formal languages to express both their semantic and syntactic properties.