Location






The seminar is held in hybrid format, in person (Múzeum krt. 4/i Room 224) and online at the following link:

https://us02web.zoom.us/j/84594385686?pwd=a7KPWoNLrPg11xNTi5Ug91YR5mHmmS.1
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6 November  (Friday) 4:15 PM  Room 224 + ONLINE 
Gergő Gila
Institute of Philosophy, Eötvös Loránd University, Budapest
 
An approach to the problem of selfless consciousness based on Georg Northoff’s temporo-spatial theory of consciousness
In recent psychedelic philosophy, the problem of phenomenological ego-dissolution during the psychedelic experience raised the question whether conscious states lacking self-consciousness are possible, thus falsifying the Self-Awareness Principle: “Necessarily, whenever one is in a conscious state, one is minimally self-aware.” Several solutions have been proposed, along the lines of distinguishing between minimal and narrative self and their neural correlates. Following Letheby’s proposal I localize the neural correlates of the minimal and narrative self in the Salience Network and the Default Mode Network, respectively. However, Letheby’s solution argues that because of the nature of the self as a construct created by predictive processing, we must take an anti-realist stance against the self.
I propose an approach that purportedly nuances and dissolves the problem by taking Georg Northoff’s notion of pre-phenomenal self, which can persist through the phenomenal experience of the dissolution of minimal and narrative forms of self. Northoff’s pre-phenomenal self shifts the focus from the cognitive, social and affective neural correlates of the different forms of self, instead concentrating on the topographic and dynamic, that is spatial and temporal structure of the brain-mind relation. I agree with Northoff that by the temporal structure of the brain that is characterized by scale-free, long-range temporal correlations and embedded by a neuro-ecological connection to the surrounding physical environment, we arrive at a more basic level of pre-phenomenal self. My conclusion will be that this form of self while undergoing radical changes in its structure, does persist through the psychedelic experience, even while minimal and narrative self dissolves. This approach allows us to take a realist approach to one form of self, which can even survive psychedelic ego-dissolution.




13 November  (Friday) 4:15 PM  Room 224 + ONLINE 
Amitayu Banerjee
(online)
Institute of Philosophy, Eötvös Loránd University, Budapest
Visiting Researcher, Department of Mathematics (Engineering), Amrita University
 
List-Distinguishing Chromatic Number of graphs with only small complete bigraphs
  • Let G be a simple finite graph with maximum degree ∆(G). Laszlo Babai (1977) introduced the notion of distinguishing colorings. Later, Collins and Trenk (2006) introduced the notion of distinguishing chromatic number (\chi_{D}(G)) of G as the minimum number of colors in a proper vertex coloring of G that is preserved only by the identity automorphism of G.
  • In ``Collins and Trenk; The Distinguishing Chromatic Number, Electron. J. of Combin. 13 (2006)'', Collins and Trenk proved that distinguishing chromatic number of any connected graph G is at most 2∆(G), and that the equality holds if G is the complete bigraph K_{∆(G),∆(G)} or a cycle with six vertices.
  • In 1941, Brooks proved that for any connected finite graph G with maximum degree ∆(G), the chromatic number \chi(G) of G is at most ∆(G), unless G is a complete graph or an odd cycle. 
  • In 1978, Catlin used an intriguing combinatorial trick and showed that Brooks’ upper bound can be improved if G does not contain certain types of subgraphs.
  • Ferrara--Gethner--Hartke--Stolee--Wenger (2013) introduced a variant of distinguishing chromatic number, known as
    • the list distinguishing chromatic number.  In ``Banerjee, Molnár, and Gopaulsingh; Upper Bounds for the List-Distinguishing Chromatic Number, Graphs Combin 41 (2025)'', we proved that the list distinguishing chromatic number and the distinguishing chromatic number of any connected G are not same in general,
    • the list distinguishing chromatic number is at most 2∆(G), and that the equality holds if G is the complete bigraph K_{∆(G),∆(G)} or a cycle with six vertices.
Main Result: Inspired by Catlin's combinatorial techniques from 1978, we prove that Collin's and Trenk's upper bound from 2006 (and our bound from 2025) can be improved for several classes of connected graphs that have only small complete bigraphs as induced subgraphs.
In this seminar talk, I will discuss this (details in arXiv: https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2509.11992).

Applications: We demonstrate applications of our main result for graphs whose constructions are based on Paley graphs and Cayley graphs on Dihedral groups.''



20 November  (Friday) 4:15 PM  Room 224 + ONLINE 
Michał Starzyński
 
Time dilation and other phenomena intuitively explained by spherical wave propagation and the light-speed limit c
I derive the standard Lorentz time-dilation factor from spherical wave propagation geometry combined with the light-speed limit c. This reproduces SR’s empirical time dilation without invoking either length contraction or time itself, while using only directly observed phenomena to explain those effects drawing on frequency/energy relations. In the following sections, I apply this approach to inertia, uniform motion, energy, momentum and the equivalence principle for gravity, possibly obtaining an intuitive, simple picture of a wave-based universe.

*Importantly, I am not a scholar or scientist (I run the crowdfunding platforms zrzutka.pl and 4fund.com for a living) - but I always wanted to understand time dilation. The calculations and logic I obtained followed from a line of reasoning that hit me while sitting on a lawn chair.



27 November  (Friday) 4:15 PM  Room 224 + ONLINE 
Kareem Khalifa
(online)
Department of Philosophy, University of California, Los Angeles
 
How Segregation Indices Converge
Using the case of segregation indices, I discuss how some social-scientific results' robustness licenses confidence in their accuracy. The case shows that variation in "data pipelines," i.e., sets of operations that transform detector outputs into empirical representations, can furnish a distinct kind of robustness that is undertheorized by philosophers of science. The case also suggests a methodology for social ontology in which empirical considerations figure more prominently than is typical of analytic social metaphysics.