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The
seminar is held in hybrid
format, in person (Múzeum
krt. 4/i Room 224) and
online at the following
link:
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| 6
November (Friday) 4:15
PM Room 224 + ONLINE
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Gergő
Gila
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Institute of Philosophy,
Eötvös Loránd University,
Budapest
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| An
approach to the problem of
selfless consciousness based
on Georg Northoff’s
temporo-spatial theory of
consciousness
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In recent
psychedelic philosophy, the
problem of phenomenological
ego-dissolution during the
psychedelic experience raised the
question whether conscious states
lacking self-consciousness are
possible, thus falsifying the
Self-Awareness Principle:
“Necessarily, whenever one is in a
conscious state, one is minimally
self-aware.” Several solutions
have been proposed, along the
lines of distinguishing between
minimal and narrative self and
their neural correlates. Following
Letheby’s proposal I localize the
neural correlates of the minimal
and narrative self in the Salience
Network and the Default Mode
Network, respectively. However,
Letheby’s solution argues that
because of the nature of the self
as a construct created by
predictive processing, we must
take an anti-realist stance
against the self.
I propose an approach that
purportedly nuances and dissolves
the problem by taking Georg
Northoff’s notion of
pre-phenomenal self, which can
persist through the phenomenal
experience of the dissolution of
minimal and narrative forms of
self. Northoff’s pre-phenomenal
self shifts the focus from the
cognitive, social and affective
neural correlates of the different
forms of self, instead
concentrating on the topographic
and dynamic, that is spatial and
temporal structure of the
brain-mind relation. I agree with
Northoff that by the temporal
structure of the brain that is
characterized by scale-free,
long-range temporal correlations
and embedded by a neuro-ecological
connection to the surrounding
physical environment, we arrive at
a more basic level of
pre-phenomenal self. My conclusion
will be that this form of self
while undergoing radical changes
in its structure, does persist
through the psychedelic
experience, even while minimal and
narrative self dissolves. This
approach allows us to take a
realist approach to one form of
self, which can even survive
psychedelic ego-dissolution.
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| 13
November (Friday) 4:15
PM Room 224 + ONLINE
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Amitayu
Banerjee
(online)
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Institute
of Philosophy, Eötvös Loránd
University, Budapest
Visiting Researcher,
Department of Mathematics
(Engineering), Amrita
University
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| List-Distinguishing
Chromatic Number of graphs
with only small complete
bigraphs |
- Let G be a simple finite
graph with maximum degree
∆(G). Laszlo Babai (1977)
introduced the notion of
distinguishing colorings.
Later, Collins and Trenk
(2006) introduced the notion
of distinguishing chromatic
number (\chi_{D}(G)) of G as
the minimum number of colors
in a proper vertex coloring of
G that is preserved only by
the identity automorphism of
G.
- In ``Collins and Trenk;
The Distinguishing Chromatic
Number, Electron. J. of
Combin. 13 (2006)'',
Collins and Trenk proved that
distinguishing chromatic
number of any connected graph
G is at most 2∆(G), and that
the equality holds if G is the
complete bigraph K_{∆(G),∆(G)}
or a cycle with six vertices.
- In 1941, Brooks proved that
for any connected finite graph
G with maximum degree ∆(G),
the chromatic number \chi(G)
of G is at most ∆(G), unless G
is a complete graph or an odd
cycle.
- In 1978, Catlin used an
intriguing combinatorial trick
and showed that Brooks’ upper
bound can be improved if G
does not contain certain types
of subgraphs.
- Ferrara--Gethner--Hartke--Stolee--Wenger
(2013) introduced a variant of
distinguishing chromatic
number, known as
- the list distinguishing
chromatic number. In ``Banerjee,
Molnár, and Gopaulsingh;
Upper Bounds for the
List-Distinguishing
Chromatic Number, Graphs
Combin 41 (2025)'', we
proved that the list
distinguishing chromatic
number and the
distinguishing chromatic
number of any connected G
are not same in general,
- the list distinguishing
chromatic number is at most
2∆(G), and that the equality
holds if G is the complete
bigraph K_{∆(G),∆(G)} or a
cycle with six vertices.
Main Result: Inspired by
Catlin's combinatorial techniques
from 1978, we prove that Collin's
and Trenk's upper bound from 2006
(and our bound from 2025) can be
improved for several classes of
connected graphs that have only
small complete bigraphs as induced
subgraphs.
In this seminar talk, I will
discuss this (details in arXiv:
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2509.11992).
Applications: We
demonstrate applications of our
main result for graphs whose
constructions are based on Paley
graphs and Cayley graphs on
Dihedral groups.''
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| 20
November (Friday) 4:15
PM Room 224 + ONLINE
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Michał
Starzyński
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| Time
dilation and other phenomena
intuitively explained by
spherical wave propagation
and the light-speed limit c
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I derive the
standard Lorentz time-dilation
factor from spherical wave
propagation geometry combined with
the light-speed limit c. This
reproduces SR’s empirical time
dilation without invoking either
length contraction or time itself,
while using only directly observed
phenomena to explain those effects
drawing on frequency/energy
relations. In the following
sections, I apply this approach to
inertia, uniform motion, energy,
momentum and the equivalence
principle for gravity, possibly
obtaining an intuitive, simple
picture of a wave-based universe.
*Importantly, I am not a scholar
or scientist (I run the
crowdfunding platforms zrzutka.pl
and 4fund.com
for a living) - but I always
wanted to understand time
dilation. The calculations and
logic I obtained followed from a
line of reasoning that hit me
while sitting on a lawn chair.
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| 27
November (Friday) 4:15
PM Room 224 + ONLINE
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Kareem
Khalifa
(online)
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Department
of Philosophy, University of
California, Los Angeles
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| How
Segregation Indices Converge
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Using the case of
segregation indices, I discuss how
some social-scientific results'
robustness licenses confidence in
their accuracy. The case shows
that variation in "data
pipelines," i.e., sets of
operations that transform detector
outputs into empirical
representations, can furnish a
distinct kind of robustness that
is undertheorized by philosophers
of science. The case also suggests
a methodology for social ontology
in which empirical considerations
figure more prominently than is
typical of analytic social
metaphysics.
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