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The Forum is open to everyone, including students, visitors, and faculty members from all departments and institutes!

The 60 minute lecture is followed by a 10 minute break and a 30-60 minute discussion. The language of presentation is English or Hungarian.
The scope of the Forum includes all aspects of theoretical philosophy, including:
  • logic and philosophy of formal sciences
  • philosophy of science
  • modern metaphysics
  • epistemology
  • philosophy of language
  • problems in history of philosophy and history of science, relevant to the above topics
  • particular issues in natural and social sciences, important for the discourses in the main scope of the Forum.

Location




6 April

There will be no seminar session. Instead you are invited to the following mini-conference:


20 April 4:00 PM  Room 226
Ferenc Huoranszki
Department of Philosophy, CEU, Budapest
 
A Dispositionalist Analysis of Causation
Dispositional analyses of causations are unpopular in these days. Some philosophers think that there are no dispositional properties at all only dispositional terms. Some claim that even if there are dispositional properties they are ‘causally inert’. And some claim that even if dispositional terms refer to causally relevant properties explaining causation by saying that it is an exertion of some causal power is just trivial. All these charges usually presuppose that the relation between causation and causal dispositions can only be explained by the fact that causal dispositions entail the corresponding conditional. Although I believe that they do (which is a contentious issue) I offer an alternative account of disposition ascriptions using probabilities rather than conditionals. Then I show [1] how my account can meet the standard problems about disposition ascriptions; [2] the (non-trivial) connection between disposition ascription and causation; [3] the sense in which dispositions can imply the corresponding conditionals; [4] how a dispositionalist account of causation can answer various puzzles about preemption.

27 April 4:00 PM  Room 226
Gergely Székely
Algebraic Logic, Alfréd Rényi Institute of Mathematics, Budapest
 
Megmaradási tételek a relativisztikus dinamikában
(Conservation postulates in relativistic dynamics)
Az előadásban megadjuk a relativisztikus dinamika egy elsőrendű logikai
axiómarendszerét, amely megfigyelés orientált és geometriai szemléletű. Majd megvizsgáljuk az axiómarendszer és a megmaradási tételek (tömeg, impulzus, négyesimpulzus megmaradás) logikai kapcsolatát. Az előadás lényegében véve az [1] cikk eredményeinek ismertetése.

[1]   Andréka Hajnal, Madarász X. Judit, Németi István és Székely Gergely, "Axiomatizing relativistic dynamics without conservation postulates", Studia Logica 89, 2, 2008, pp.163-186.