|
|
19 March
(Wednesday)
5:00
PM
Room 226 |
Elena
Sklifova |
Department of
Logic, Institute of
Philosophy
Eötvös University, Budapest
|
|
Topic:
non-propositional knowledge
|
TBA
|
26 May
(Wednesday)
5:00
PM
Room 226 |
Cory Wright
|
Department of
Philosophy, California State University - Long Beach
|
|
Functionalism about truth and the
modified Ramsey-Lewis sentence
|
Dialectically,
functionalists about truth create space for their view by rejecting
that of a close cousin: pluralism about truth. The rejection is based,
inter alia, on arguments for the claim that pluralism is incoherent or
otherwise unstable. Functionalists then employ Ramsification to
produce an implicit definition of the theoretical term /true/ in order
to show that their view is appropriately monistic and unequivocal, but
can nevertheless accommodate the pluralists' intuitions. In this talk,
I show why the instability arguments fail, and then show that
employment of Ramsification itself instigates a kind of epistemic
circularity; for using it requires determining that the theory which
introduces that term is itself true. Without a dissolution, this
problem is sufficient to render functionalism about truth
inadequate. Lastly, I consider a variety of putative dissolutions
to the problem of epistemic circularity---each of which is shown to be
unsatisfactory---and then offer a solution on functionalists’
behalf. The upshot, however, is that they must tread on their
anti-pluralist commitments.
|
|
|
|