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6
May (Wednesday)
5:00 PM Room
226
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No seminar
session
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13
May (Wednesday)
5:00 PM
Room 226
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Andor Budai
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Department
of Theoretical
Physics, Faculty
of Science
Eötvös University
Budapest
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A
sokvilág-interpretáció
bemutatása
(On
the many-world
interpretation of
quantum mechanics)
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Hugh
Everett javasolta
először a
kvantumfizika sokvilág
interpretációját.
Azóta sokan
foglalkoztak a
témával, és
sokféleképpen
értelmezték azt.
A diplomamunka célja
tárgyilagosan
bemutatni az egyes
értelmezéseket,
megvilágítani a
sokvilág interpretáció
eltéréseit a többitől,
valamint megvizsgálni
a lehetséges
bizonyítási
eljárásokat. |
20
May (Wednesday)
5:00 PM Room
226
Postponed to
the next week! - in
order to avoid
conflict with Bryan
Roberts's lecture in
the Institute of
Philosophy (Research
Centre for the
Humanities, HAS)
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Ádám Tamás Tuboly
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Doctoral
School of Philosophy,
University of Pécs
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Rudolf
Carnap’s Logische Syntax
der Sprache (1934) is
usually taken as a landmark
both in the history of
logical empiricism and
twentieth century analytic
philosophy. For a long time,
one aspect of the book,
namely the principle of
tolerance, PoT, was
just simply neglected.
Recent scholarship, however,
has considered it to be one
of the most important
achievements of Syntax.
Such scholars as Michael
Friedman, Thomas Ricketts,
André Carus, Stewe Awodey
tried to focus on the
overwhelming technical and
philosophical consequences
of PoT, furthermore others,
such as Thomas Uebel, has
shown its historical context
in the Vienna Circle.
In my presentation I shall
defend the following thesis:
even if we acknowledge the
important influence of Hans
Hahn, Karl Menger and Otto
Neurath on the PoT, and even
if we try to uncover its
underlying ideas from the
point of view of Russell and
Wittgenstein, we still miss
something very important.
Those explanatory elements
which I shall focus on are
the Weltanschauung
and cultural heritage of the
young Carnap from his time
in the German Youth
Movement, the Jugendbewegung.
My thesis is that in order
to obtain Carnap’s famous
PoT we have to extend the
limits of Russell’s
pragmatic-inductive
considerations regarding
logic put forward, for
example, in Principia
Mathematica. To do
this, Carnap has accepted
the idea of Wittgenstein,
namely that logic is empty
of any empirical content.
Since logical is
tautological (which Russell
has denied) we seem to have
the relevant freedom to
formulate PoT. Wittgenstein,
however, did not draw the
same conclusion, so have to
deal with the question that
what did Carnap have that
Wittgenstein didn’t? The
answer could be found around
Carnap’s time in the German
Youth Movement.
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