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| 4
November (Wednesday)
5:00 PM
Room 226 |
Zsolt
Ziegler
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Department
of Philosophy and History of
Science
Budapest University of
Technology and Economics
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| Moral
Responsibility,
Compatibilism,
Incompatibilism,
Determinism,
Indeterminism,
Control |
This paper introduces a
new theory of moral responsibility
that does not rely on any concept
of human control. It is referred
to as the ‘theory of relational
responsibility' because it claims
that, in order for a person to be
responsible, she has to act in a
certain type of situation that
needs to be such that there is at
least one relevantly similar
situation in which the agent (be
she the same person or not)
refrains from performing the
action that was executed in the
original case. Person A cannot be
held responsible for doing what
she does if no person (including
herself) refrains from performing
that action in a relevantly
similar situation. The theory is
neutral regarding the truth of
determinism and indeterminism,
that is beneficial for two
reasons. First, it provides a
unified conceptual framework with
a unique relational schema for
attributing responsibility.
Second, it is acceptable to both
determinists and indeterminists,
as relational responsibility
requires the world to be neither
deterministic nor indeterministic,
and thus any concept of agency—be
it compatibilist or libertarian—is
compatible with it. One’s
understanding of determinism
shapes the possible set of views
one can take regarding control,
and there is no account of control
that could be held simultaneously
by both compatibilists and
incompatibilists. In order to
avoid the conflict between the two
positions, the relational theory
of responsibility aims to provide
an account of responsibility with
no reference to the notion of
control.
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| 11
November (Wednesday)
5:00 PM
Room 226 |
| Tomas
Veloz |
Mathematics,
University of British
Columbia, Canada
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| Toward
a Quantum
Theory of
Cognition:
History,
Development
and
Perspectives |
Information processing
at a conceptual level is
considered to be one of the
hardest challenges in Cognitive
Science. In particular, a number
of studies in behavioral research
have shown that humans process
concepts in a way that is
incompatible with traditional
frameworks such as classical
probability and fuzzy set
theory. Recently, this
incompatibility has been shown to
occur at a deep structural level,
and mathematical schemes founded
on quantum structures have been
proposed as alternative modeling
frameworks. The quantum approach
allows to faithfully model a
number of non-classical deviations
observed in experimental data.
Moreover, it shows that genuine
quantum theoretical notions, such
as contextuality, superposition,
emergence and entanglement, are
interesting epistemic tools to
understand and represent hard
problems in Artificial
Intelligence. In this talk, we
identify the limitations of
traditional frameworks to handle
some important cognitive tasks,
introduce the fundamentals of this
quantum cognitive approach, and
present some remarkable
applications.
Related links (updated: 19
November 2015)
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| 18
November (Wednesday)
5:00 PM
Room 226 |
Gergely
Székely
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Alfréd
Rényi Institute of
Mathematics, Budapest
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Principle
of Relativity,
Isotropy and
Homogeneity
(Reloaded)
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This talk is a
self-contained continuation of
Judit X. Madarász's TPF talk
"Principle of Relativity, Isotropy
and Homogeneity". We will start
from the same point, namely the
tension between a claim in
Rindler's book [2] and a
construction in paper [1], but we
proceed differently and offer a
different resolution for the
apparent contradiction.
Rindler claims that "the principle
of relativity is equivalent to the
isotropy (of space) and the
homogeneity (of space and time)"
[2., p.40]. Contrary to this claim
there is a construction of an
anisotropic extension of the
standard model of special
relativity which still satisfies
the principle of relativity [1.,
construction proving Theorem 2].
Of course, the contradiction is
only apparent as something else is
meant by 'the principle of
relativity' in [1] and in [2],
even the mathematical language of
the two frameworks are
different.
Still, these examples show that
there are (at least) two
inequivalent formulation of the
principle of relativity. It seems
natural to ask which formulation
is the 'true one'?
Since the principle of relativity
is an informal idea and ideas can
clearly be formulated several
different ways, the right question
is not which formulation is the
'true one', but how do the
different formulations are related
to one another.
We will use a logic based
axiomatic framework of the
Andréka--Németi group and
Rindler's distinctions between
inertial frames and inertial
coordinate systems to investigate
the connection between these two
versions of the principle of
relativity. We will see that the
principle of relativity in [2] is
understood for coordinate systems
and the construction in [1]
satisfies the principle of
relativity understood for
reference frames.
Based on Galileo's ship argument,
we will also argue that the
original intuition behind the
principle of relativity is better
reflected if we formulate it for
reference frames only.
[1] H. Andréka, J. X. Madarász, I.
Németi, M. Stannett and G.
Székely.
Faster than light motion does not
imply time travel
Classical and Quantum Gravity
31:(9) Paper 095005. 11 pp.
(2014).
arXiv:1407.2528
[2] W. Rindler. Relativity:
Special, General, and
Cosmological.
Oxford University Press (2001).
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Postponed
to 17 February
2016
25 November (Wednesday)
5:00 PM
Room 226 |
Márta
Ujvári
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Institute
of Sociology and Social
Policy
Corvinus University,
Budapest
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Haecceitas
Napjainkban és
Duns
Scotusnál:
Tulajdonság
vagy Entitás?
(Haecceity
Today and with Duns Scotus:
Property or Entity?)
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A mai domináns
filozófiai felfogás a
haecceitást sajátos,
nem-kvalitatív tulajdonságnak
tekinti. Funkciója tehát az,
hogy nem-kvalitatív módon
biztosítsa a konkrét
individuumok világokon át való
azonosságát. Scotus számára
ellenben a haecceitas az
individuális különbséget nyújtó
entitas positiva, aminek
köszönhetően a dolog nem pusztán
a specifikus természetének
példánya. A történeti és a mai
nézetek eltérnek egymástól az
ontológiai hátterük tekintetében
is. Ezeket figyelembe vesszük a
nézetek előnyeinek és
hátrányainak mérlegelésekor.
Közös vonásokat is fogunk
azonban találni. Javaslatom
alapvetően az, hogy egyik nézet
sem támasztja alá azt, hogy a
haecceitas valamiféle egyedi
lényeg lenne.
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