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| 22
February (Wednesday)
5:00 PM
Room 226 |
Christopher
Gauker
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Department
of Philosophy, University of
Salzburg
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A Third
Concepiton of the Normativity
of Meaning
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Widespread skepticism
toward a naturalistic conception
of meaning encourages us to adopt
a conception of meaning as
normative. According to a
first conception of the
normativity of meaning, statements
about the meaning of an expression
directly entail statements about
how the expression ought to be
used. An effective objection
against this conception is that
the normative entailments are at
most instrumental norms. According
to a second conception of the
normativity of meaning, normative
rules of use are constitutive of
the meaning of an expression.
Meanings so explicated might be
supposed to play several
theoretical roles, but above all
they are supposed to figure in a
certain theory of linguistic
communication. Unfortunately,
meanings so conceived cannot
perform the work thus assigned to
them. Even once we have abandoned
the conception of meanings as
fundamental theoretical entities
in the theory of language, we may
take an interest in the specific
role that terms such as “means”
play in interpersonal cooperation.
Here there is room for a third
conception of the normativity of
meaning. Statements about meanings
may be viewed as proposals
concerning the uses of words, the
acceptance of which will have
normative consequences.
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