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| 11
April (Wednesday)
5:00 PM Room
226 |
László E.
Szabó
|
Department
of Logic, Institute of Philosophy
Eötvös
University Budapest
|
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Intrinsic, extrinsic,
and the
constitutive a
priori
|
If Reichenbach*
is right that physical properties
are constitutive a priori,
then the intrinsic--extrinsic
distinction is flawed.
________
* Hans Reichenbach: The
Theory of Relativity and A
Priori Knowledge,
University of California Press,
Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1965
(1920).
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| 18
April (Wednesday)
5:00 PM Room
226 |
Tamás
Bitai
|
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Institute
of Philosophy, Eötvös
University Budapest
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|
Is Bayesian
confirmation theory
empty?
|
An argument for Bayesian
confirmation theory is the
"washing out of the priors",
namely that subjective
probabilities of a hypothesis
expressing a probabilistic
assertion converge to 1 in case
evidences come in according to the
hypothesis, and 0 otherwise, no
matter what its initial subjective
probability was. However, in the
literature, the meaning of this
"according to the hypothesis" is
either unspecified, or is given
employing a rather heavy
theoretical basis. In this talk we
give a simple frequentist
interpretation for it, and show
that under plausible conditions,
the convergence of the subjective
probabilities is actually
equivalent to the convergence of
the relative frequencies, thus
Bayesian confirmation is "empty",
since instead of Bayesian updating
we could simply count the relative
frequencies.
|
25
April
(Wednesday) 5:00
PM Room
226
Cancelled
and postponed to
May.
|
Balázs
Gyenis
|
Institute of
Philosophy, Research
Centre for the Humanities,
Budapest
|
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Physical
possibility for
actualists
|
TBA
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