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Intentionality – a Physicalist Account

lecture course
Wed 16:00-17:30, Room 224 (Múzeum krt. 4/i)


Codes:
BMA-LOTD17-206.02
BMI-LOTD17-206E.02
BBN-FIL-401.59
BMA-FILD-401.59
BA-ERA-IPH-L-25
MA-ERA-IPH-L-29

Program

LyX Document

LyX Document

Intentionality is aboutness; the feature of thoughts and words, whereby they refer to, or are about things. The main topic of this course is naturalizing intentionality; that is to say, whether we can give an account of intentionality that can be reconciled with a physicalist (or naturalist) world view; whether we can give an account of how it can be that, as John Haugeland puts it, “any part or feature of the universe represents or is a reason for another”.
The usual discourse on the problem of intentionality takes place in a quite absurd philosophical context; a context which is a cross-section of a bundle of totally incompatible doctrines. To give just one example: for physicalism it is a perfectly natural idea to explain the relationship between intentional states and intentional objects in terms of causal processes in the world. In the usual discourse, one of the serious objections to the causal theory is that it is inadequate for capturing representations of abstract objects, such as logical and mathematical objects. Meanwhile, physicalism denies the mere existence of abstract objects. It seems that the whole discourse is directed towards providing an interpretation of intentionality that is equally consistent with Platonism, mentalism, physicalism, fictionalism, modal realism and modal anti-realism, empiricism, rationalism, operationalism, and holism; with all views on the nature of logic, mathematics, language, and the mind; with all positions on the fundamental questions of epistemology and philosophy of science. The result is perhaps not surprising. As Cathal O'Madagain writes in the last sentence of his article 'Intentionality' in The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy: “as things stand, there is no widely accepted solution to the problem presented by intensionality for naturalizing intentionality.”
The aim of the course is to sketch a description of the phenomenon of intentionality that remains exclusively within the framework of a physicalist ontology. As we shall see, this is made possible precisely by a strict adherence to the ontological framework imposed by physicalism.

Readings

  • J. Haugeland: Having Thought -- Essays in the metaphysics of mind,  ("The Intentionality All-Stars"), Harvard University Press, Cambridge MA,1998.
  • C. O’Madagain: Intentionality, The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy,  https://iep.utm.edu/intentio/ (2022-08-18)
  • T. Crane: Intentionality, Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Version 1.0, London and New York: Routledge (1998).
  • L. E. Szabó: Meaning, Truth, and Physics, In G. Hofer-Szabó, L. Wroński  (eds.), Making it Formally Explicit, European Studies in Philosophy of Science 6. (Springer International Publishing, 2017) DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-55486-0_9. (Preprint: //philsci-archive.pitt.edu/14769/)
  • L. E. Szabó: Physicalism without the idols of mathematics. [Preprint], (2021), //philsci-archive.pitt.edu/20980/ 

Further readings

  • W. Lyons: Approaches to Intentionality, Oxford University Press, 2002.
  • J. Searle: Intentionality,  Cambridge University Press 1983.
  • T. Crane, The Objects of Thought, Oxford University Press, 2013.
  • L.E.Szabó: Intrinsic, extrinsic, and the constitutive a priori, Foundations of Physics  50, 555–567 (2020).  DOI: 10.1007/s10701-019-00281-z  (Open Access: https://rdcu.be/bKxdO)
Grading criteria, specific requirements:, 

Oral exam from the material of the lectures. Video records and the slides of the lectures will be available.








2022-08-29
  






 






Múzeum krt. 4/i



 
2008